RVP's role explained (Goonersweb)

QUOTE

The Question: Why are teams so tentative about false nines?

If players who appear to be playing centre-forward, but drop deep, are so dangerous, why don't more teams trust the system?

Last season, Lionel Messi dropped deep and disrupted the opposition marking, having started in a central position. Photograph: Adam Davy/Empics Sport

When one team does it, it's happenstance. When Barcelona follow Manchester United in doing it, it's coincidence. Add in Roma as well, and it starts to become a pattern. Teams who use a "false nine" – that is, a player who appears to be playing centre-forward, but drops deep – seem, however successful they have been, not to trust the system.

The season before last, United won the Premier League and the Champions League using Carlos Tevez as a centre-forward who regularly dropped off or pulled wide, creating space for Wayne Rooney coming from deep, or for Cristiano Ronaldo cutting in from the right. The following season, they brought in Dimitar Berbatov, a more orthodox centre-forward, and reverted to a more traditional way of playing.

Last season as Barcelona won the treble of La Liga, Copa del Rey and Champions League, they often switched Samuel Eto'o and Lionel Messi so that, instead of playing in what might be considered their natural positions, Messi played centrally and Eto'o on the right. Messi naturally dropped deep, disrupting the opposition's marking. In the summer, Barcelona replaced Eto'o with Zlatan Ibrahimovic, a player who, for all his quality, is not going to be able to operate on the right wing and so liberate Messi.

Roma at least had a 7-1 defeat at Old Trafford to point to as an explanation for abandoning the false nine after they had – broadly successfully – experimented with Francesco Totti as a centre-forward who dropped deep, but for United and Barcelona the reasons for abandoning a successful shape are less obvious.

Where did the false nine come from?

In England, the centre-forward tended traditionally to be a big target-man figure – what Brian Glanville characterised as "the brainless bull at the gate". His job was, essentially, to meet crosses. Elsewhere, though, where skill was prioritised over physicality, he soon became something rather more subtle, and there is evidence to suggest that by the 1920s it was not uncommon for centre-forwards in central Europe and around the River Plate to drop deep.

The first England came across was Matthias Sindelar in a friendly against Austria at Stamford Bridge in 1932. England ended up winning 4-3, but there was a widespread recognition that Sindelar, a slight but imaginative forward, had unnerved England by moving into midfield, looking to make the play as much as to finish chances.

In Argentina and Uruguay at the time, it was common for the two inside-forwards to play very deep, and it would be strange if there hadn't been some kind of experimentation with a centre-forward dropping off as well. Certainly by the time of River Plate's fabled La Maquina side of the late 40s, the nominal centre-forward, Adolfo Pedernera, often dropped off, with Angel Labruna, the inside-left, becoming the main goal threat.

English teams continued to be perplexed by forwards who refused to stand still and let themselves be marked. Vsevolod Bobrov unsettled everybody he played against on Dinamo Moscow's 1945 tour; Alfred Bickel's performance was the main reason for England's defeat to Switzerland in 1947; and in 1951, in what was technically only a representative game, an England XI lost 3-1 to an Argentina XI, their centre-half, Malcolm Barrass, having been dragged out of position by the Argentinian centre-forward José Lacasia.

England's manager Walter Winterbottom, acknowledging the problem, held a team meeting to try to come up with a counter-measure for the full international that was scheduled for a few days later. "Some people wanted to have a man following him," he said, "dogging his footsteps, but Billy [Wright] quite vehemently wanted the centre-half to stay back, in position, and let someone else pick off Lacasia.

"We decided that [Harry] Johnston, the centre-half, would go with him in the early part of the match, with Billy and Jimmy Dickinson [the two wing-halves] covering the gap in the middle, then Johnston would fall back in favour of someone else so that the Argentina team would not quite know if we were going to persist in man-to-man marking. But the match was washed out by rain after 20 minutes play so that the issue was not really joined."

Two years later, Johnston found himself similarly bemused by Nandor Hidegkuti, as England were beaten 6-3 by Hungary at Wembley. "To me," he wrote in his autobiography, "the tragedy was the utter helplessness … being unable to do anything to alter the grim outlook." Fabio Cannavaro admitted something similar after Real Madrid had been beaten 6-2 by Barcelona at the Bernabéu last season.

Why is the false nine so hard to combat?

Man-marking barely exists at the top level of the game any more, at least not in open play, but even with zonal marking the game falls into certain patterns. When 4-4-2 meets 4-4-2, for instance, essentially the two centre-backs pick up the two centre-forwards, the two central midfielders deal with the two central midfielders, and the wide-midfielders pick each other up, with the full-backs behind should one wide midfielder get beyond the other one.

One of the keys to tactical success is to break those patterns in a way that is advantageous; at its most basic level to overman in key zones. If a centre-forward drops deep, he is moving away from the centre-backs who would naturally mark him. If the centre-back follows, he risks leaving space that can be exploited by wide players cutting in, or by midfielders coming from deep. But if he sits off, the deep-lying centre-forward has freedom, time and space either to pick his pass or to turn and run at a defence so he is arriving at the centre-back at pace, which makes him far harder to stop.

The holding midfielder could pick up the deep-lying centre-forward, but that has knock-on effects elsewhere on the pitch. When 4-4-2 meets 4-4-2, if a centre-forward drops back into midfield, he effectively gives his team three men in there against two; there is overmanning. Equally, a midfielder restricting his attacking role to pick up an opposing centre-forward risks surrendering territory, so his team end up playing too deep, inviting pressure.

Why has the issue arisen again?

English football, with its simplistic tactical shapes, has traditionally struggled with players who don't stand where they're supposed to, which in part explains the success of the likes of Eric Cantona, Gianfranco Zola and Dennis Bergkamp in the 90s. Just by operating in the grey area between the opponent's defensive and midfield lines, they caused confusion, and created new, unfamiliar angles of attack.

Back then, though, teams tended to play with a more orthodox central striker ahead of the deep-lying player and so, while they proved difficult to combat, they were easy to conceptualise as a strike partnership (they were not false nines so much as orthodox 10s). One centre-back picked up the orthodox forward, and the other had a certain licence to follow the deeper-lying one, secure in the knowledge he had a central defender behind him, and that, if the wide midfielders were doing their job, at least one of the full-backs was likely to be free to tuck in. The trend towards a single central striker, though, has taken us back to a situation similar to that of the early 50s.

When a back four meets a 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1, the full-backs, even ignoring the increased attacking role they have in today's game, have a clearly defined role in negating the opposition wingers. They are less likely, in other words, to be able to provide cover. But worse, if the false nine drops deep, there are two centre-backs left redundant. One can follow the false nine, but the other is left isolated, with space all around and the full-backs too busy with their own concerns to help him. He can be attacked from wide or from deep, and he has no support.

That is the position in which Harry Johnston found himself in 1953, with the cherry-red blur of Laszlo Budai, Sandor Kocsis, Ferenc Puskas and Zoltan Czibor swarming all around him, and the player he thought he was supposed to be marking off directing things in the far distance, wandering forward at will to score three times. And it was the position in which Cannavaro found himself in May.

So why do teams turn against it?

Why, if false nines are so dangerous, do teams who have used them successfully then turn away from them. It is, frankly, rather puzzling, and there is no easy answer. Neither Roma nor Manchester United seem to have intended to use what remains the most radical of tactical innovations; both were forced into it by injury. Similarly, Barcelona had intended to replace Eto'o before the start of last season – who knows what Pep Guardiola's plan may have been had he been able to.

The move towards the evolutionary avant-garde at United, perhaps, was inspired by Carlos Quieroz – who had dabbled with a form of strikerlessness with the Portugal youth sides who won the World Youth Cup in 1989 and 1991. With his departure went the impulse to innovation. Had Tevez's contract situation been less fraught, the urge to bring in Berbatov may not have been so strong.

In all three cases there are specific circumstances that make the move away from the false nine understandable if not entirely explicable. But there is also the simple fact that playing a false nine is a risk. When it works, it can be devastating, but it doesn't need much to go wrong to become stodgy or toothless.

Hungary, for instance, looked almost unstoppable for much of the early 50s, but there were occasions when it didn't quite click. Sweden held them to a 2-2 draw in Budapest shortly before the Wembley game by sitting deep, disrupting their passing by weight of numbers. The following year heavy pitches not conducive to passing football contributed to Hungary's defeat to West Germany in the World Cup final and the defeat of Honved, who provided the bulk of the national team, to Wolves in a floodlit friendly at Molineux.

A tall centre-forward who can hold the ball up – as both Berbatov and Ibrahimovic can – gives another option. He can be an outlet ball from defence and, by offering an aerial threat, also prevents opponents from simply sitting deep. Kocsis, of course, was such a noted header of the ball that he was nicknamed Golden Head, but he was more a finisher of chances than somebody who could take the ball on his chest and hold off a defender while waiting for support.

United may have been less aesthetically pleasing last season, but they were defensively sounder, something at least in part down to the greater ease with which they held possession. This is largely a matter of degree: Berbatov and Ibrahimovic are not the brainless bull at the gate type of forward; both can drop off and create play as well as leading the line. They offer flexibility of style, but not quite the fluency of movement of the players who went before.

Both sides are still capable of overwhelming weaker teams (or even respectable mid-table teams) – as Barcelona did to Zaragoza on Sunday and United, eventually, to Wigan earlier in the season, but the emphasis has been shifted towards solidity. Which leaves Arsenal, as ever, to carry the standard for risky, free-flowing football. Robin van Persie may be a more natural leader of a line than either Messi or Tevez, but he is the falsest nine European football has at the moment.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/blog/2009/...jonathan-wilson

Good read

interesting stuff for me as i'm not that experienced in footballing tactics.
:goodpost:

so RVP is playing the berkamp role instead of arshavin. Quite surprising really - arshavin reads the game far better (when he can be arsed and isnt coughing his guts out)

Actually *couch* maybe *heave* not so odd after all.

QUOTE (Nayan @ Oct 28 2009, 05:32 AM)

so RVP is playing the berkamp role instead of arshavin. Quite surprising really - arshavin reads the game far better (when he can be arsed and isnt coughing his guts out)

Actually *couch* maybe *heave* not so odd after all.

I think it makes better sense to have a player like RvP take that role rather than the tricky Russian.

Consider the strikers qualities, hammer of a shot, ability to create from nothing, and ability to hold up the ball (by turning and not pure strength.)
Consider Arshavin ... ability to drive through defenders and nick a shot from ANY angle! Fast feet, fast brain, with a quick momentum.

To me it makes total sense to keep Arshavin out of the "false nine" slot as he is more dangerous breaking forwards ... RvP is great at gaining a few seconds by twisting and turning to allow a player like Arshavin to thunder forwards ... also RvP has the known ability to rocket in a shot from distance which gives him an edge in unpredictability.

The way I see it Arshavin isn't a striker, he's an attacking playmaker.

If RVP is going to play the Bergkamp role then Eduardo if he's ever fit is best option as striker.

Nice article.

As I understand it though, the proliferation of modern DMs is down to the need to patrol the grey area and fill in the gaps where people drop off (even false nines) I don't think they're as easily confused nowadays, nice to have some historical background to it.

Good read

QUOTE (Spiggsy @ Oct 28 2009, 01:15 PM)

QUOTE (Nayan @ Oct 28 2009, 05:32 AM)

so RVP is playing the berkamp role instead of arshavin. Quite surprising really - arshavin reads the game far better (when he can be arsed and isnt coughing his guts out)

Actually *couch* maybe *heave* not so odd after all.

I think it makes better sense to have a player like RvP take that role rather than the tricky Russian.

Consider the strikers qualities, hammer of a shot, ability to create from nothing, and ability to hold up the ball (by turning and not pure strength.)
Consider Arshavin ... ability to drive through defenders and nick a shot from ANY angle! Fast feet, fast brain, with a quick momentum.

To me it makes total sense to keep Arshavin out of the "false nine" slot as he is more dangerous breaking forwards ... RvP is great at gaining a few seconds by twisting and turning to allow a player like Arshavin to thunder forwards ... also RvP has the known ability to rocket in a shot from distance which gives him an edge in unpredictability.

rvp until recently would take two touches, then look up up and decider whether to wind up that hammer of a shot, or try to turn a defender inside out. His passes were, in general, an afterthought.

By contrast, bergkamp could often be relied on to set up a defence splitting pass or sublime layoff, or of course shoot with his first or second touch. Moreover, he'd have mapped them out in terms of plan A, plan b, and PLan C before the man playing the ball to him had done so.

Maybe I'm exaggerating a bit, but not much.

RVP is getting there, but isnt there yet. To his credit he no longer looks like a youth player dropping deep looking for the ball because he doesnt know where to run and is getting frustrated by the CBs. What he does he seems to do with more purpose and assuredness these days. The jury is stil lout on whether he will be world class striker/fake number 9/whatever we've beenw waiting for though.

this guy is always writing decent tactical articles tbf. such as...

QUOTE

The Question: is the box-to-box midfielder dead?
In the latest in our series analysing football tactics, we look at where the Robsons, Keanes and Matthaus's have gone in the modern game

Doing some research into the 1990 World Cup recently, I was struck by a comment made by the England manager Bobby Robson after his captain, Bryan Robson, had picked up his customary World Cup injury, rupturing an Achilles during the 0-0 draw against the Netherlands. Bryan is, Bobby said, "as good a player as we've ever produced".

As good a player as we've ever produced. Even allowing for the magnifying lens of context, for the sense of despair Bobby Robson must have felt to lose his captain at such a crucial stage – and just when England had produced a performance, if not a result, to rebuff their most poisonous critics – that is an extraordinary statement. Not "he'll be a big loss", not "he's been a key player for us over the years", but "as good a player as we've ever produced".

The stats show the importance of Robson the player to Robson the manager. Bobby was in charge for 88 games. Bryan played in 62 of those, of which England lost only 10; of the 26 he missed, England lost seven. So that got me thinking: if Robson really is one of the best ever, where would he fit in the present England set-up?

And the answer is that he wouldn't, not comfortably, not if England continue to play a loose 4-2-3-1. It seems churlish to define such a great player by what he was not, but did he really have the technical ability to operate in one of the three attacking midfield slots? But equally, given his goal-scoring ability, would it not be a waste to play him as a holding player? And, anyway, until his pace had gone late in his career, did he really have the discipline to operate as one of the holding players?

He would probably have to play in the awkward compromise position Frank Lampard occupied against Slovakia and Ukraine, as the freer of the two holders, alongside a Gareth Barry figure. Which would just about work, I think, and yet it seems terrible to circumscribe the role of a player whose greatest assets were his stamina, his courage and his completeness. And anyway, that role seems best occupied not by a shuttler chafing constantly at the reins, but by an intelligent passer such as Xabi Alonso or Michael Carrick.

And then it occurred to me that complete midfielders, those great drivers of teams who could both score goals and make tackles, are generally a declining breed. After Robson there came Löthar Matthaus, David Platt, then Roy Keane and thereafter, well, nobody. The question is why.

Reason one: The decline of the traditional 4-4-2 formation and the rise of the holding midfielderPerhaps the point is not that complete midfielders don't exist so much as that they are no longer able to play as complete midfielders. Michael Ballack, Cesc Fàbregas and Michael Essien, for instance, have all played this season both as holding midfielders and as attacking midfielders, but rarely, if at all, just as midfielders.

This, surely, is the key issue in the debate over whether Steven Gerrard and Frank Lampard, both of whom would seem to have the full range of attributes that in a previous age would have made them Robson-style box-to-box players, can play together in the same midfield.

In a sense, the problem is less the answer than the question. For what the question omits is the assumption that we're taking about them playing together in the centre of a 4-4-2 (for how, until Fabio Capello opened our eyes, could our players possibly have veered from the one true path of 4-4-2?).

This, arguably, was the main reason for the farrago of the golden generation: England were blessed with a remarkably talented generation of players; the problem was that Michael Owen and David Beckham needed a 4-4-2, while Frank Lampard and Steven Gerrard needed an additional holding player. Neither Sven-Göran Eriksson nor Steve McClaren ever had the clarity of thought to opt for one system over the other and cull players accordingly. It was almost as though football itself were taunting England for its lack of tactical sophistication and its concomitant obeisance to the cult of the celebrity player.

Perhaps in a club situation, working together every day, Lampard and Gerrard could have come to an understanding, but at international level they palpably couldn't. The World Cup qualifier away to Austria in September 2004 showcased the problem. Both Lampard and Gerrard scored, and with 20 minutes to go England seemed comfortable, only for Roland Kollmann to knock in a free-kick conceded by Lampard, and Andreas Ivanschitz to equalise with a drive that deflected off Gerrard and squirmed under David James.

Both goals, ultimately, resulted from the vast space that opened up between back four and midfield as Gerrard and Lampard advanced. That area has always been English football's great weakness. It was from that position that Matthias Sindelar almost exposed England when Austria lost 4-3 at Stamford Bridge in 1932, from that position that Vsevolod Bobrov so tormented Chelsea in their 4-4 draw against Dinamo Moscow in 1945, and, most notoriously, from that position that Nandor Hidegkuti crafted Hungary's 6-3 demolition of England in 1953. Even in the 1990s, Eric Cantona and Gianfranco Zola were able to exploit the stratified nature of the average English set-up, prospering in the space between the lines.

As lone forwards became increasingly common, so it became increasingly necessary for sides to deploy a midfield holder to combat the withdrawn forward, precipitating the gradual shift – at the highest level at least - to 4-2-3-1. Once that formation has been adopted, midfielders are necessarily categorised as either defensive or attacking, and completeness, although it allows a player to play in either role, becomes within the immediate context of the game far less of an asset.

Reason two: modern football is about specialistsThe game nowadays increasingly demands universality. It is no longer enough simply to be a winger or a playmaker or a poacher. Full-backs have to be able to attack. Which makes the decline of the most universal player on the pitch paradoxical.

It also explains the distaste of Arrigo Sacchi – along with Valeriy Lobanovskyi one of the two high priests of universality – for 4-2-3-1. "Today's football is about managing the characteristics of individuals," he said. "And that's why you see the proliferation of specialists. The individual has trumped the collective. But it's a sign of weakness. It's reactive, not pro-active."

Sacchi saw that most clearly during his time as sporting director of Real Madrid in 2004. "There was no project; it was about exploiting qualities," he said. "So, for example, we knew that Zidane, Raúl and Figo didn't track back, so we had to put a guy in front of the back four who would defend. But that's reactionary football. It doesn't multiply the players' qualities exponentially. Which actually is the point of tactics: to achieve this multiplier effect on the players' abilities. In my football, the regista – the playmaker – is whoever had the ball. But if you have [Claude] Makélélé, he can't do that. He doesn't have the ideas to do it, though of course, he's great at winning the ball. It's all about specialists."

Sacchi remains as committed to 4-4-2 now as he was when his AC Milan side won successive European Cups in 1989 and 1990. Neither of his central midfield pairing of Carlo Ancelotti and Frank Rijkaard were as prolific as Robson or Matthaus, but both were certainly capable of both destroying and creating. Given players with the physical and technical attributes of Lampard and Gerrard, he would, presumably, play both in a 4-4-2 – if, that is, they had the mental attributes he demanded. He is not sure that Gerrard, in particular, does.

"When I was director of football at Real Madrid I had to evaluate the players coming through the youth ranks," he said in response to a question about Gerrard. "We had some who were very good footballers. They had technique, they had athleticism, they had drive, they were hungry. But they lacked what I call knowing-how-to-play-football. They lacked decision-making. They lacked positioning. They didn't have that subtle sensitivity of football: how a player should move within the collective.

"You see, strength, passion, technique, athleticism, all of these are very important. But they are a means to an end, not an end in itself. They help you reach your goal, which is putting your talent at the service of the team, and, by doing this, making both you and the team greater. So, situations like that, I just have to say, he's a great footballer, but perhaps not a great player."

Rafa Benítez, who is probably the most Sacchian manager English football has known, seems to have harboured similar doubts. Twice, he was willing to sell his captain (to Chelsea, who would presumably have used Lampard and Gerrard to flank Makelele in a 4-3-3), and his regular deployment of Gerrard on the right or the left of a midfield four was surely evidence of his uneasiness at giving him responsibility in the centre.

It was, of course, the use of Didi Hamann as a holding player that released Gerrard in the 2005 Champions League final, while Benítez's conversion to 4-2-3-1 more recently has given Gerrard licence, because he has two holders behind him. Gerrard started as a complete midfielder, might have become a holding midfielder who get forward, and has become instead an attacking midfielder who can put in the odd tackle.

Lampard's role at Chelsea is slightly deeper-lying, but he is, none the less, more comfortable with a holding player behind him. It will be fascinating to see whether he has the acuity to adapt to the slightly more defensive brief Capello seems to envisage for him with England.

The question then is the extent to which the need to use Gerrard and Lampard in conjunction with more defensive players is a facet of them lacking "knowing-how-to-play-football", and how much it is inherent in the way the tactical evolution of the game has affected the position they grew up playing.

To an extent, the comparison of England's 2004 performance against Austria and a Sacchi side is absurd, for no Sacchi side would ever allow the sort of gap between defensive and midfield lines to open up as emerged in Vienna (something that may, in part, have been caused by the defence's desire to prevent David James, who was having one of his more erratic days, from being tempted into leaving his box).

Reason three: the liberalisation in the offside lawThat said, Sacchi's ideal was for attack and defence to be separated by no more than 25m, providing a compact structure that facilitated his hard-pressing game, and it may be that such a high defensive line is no longer practicable given the liberalisation of the offside law.

It is impossible to prove, but it seems reasonable to suggest that Sacchi's approach would be undermined today as much by the modern interpretation of offside as by the egos of millionaire modern players. The change in the offside law has stretched the game, so we now tend to see it in four bands, and it is that that has effectively decommissioned the complete midfielder.

Historically, that is entirely consistent. The notion of a complete midfielder itself is far from constant across football's history. It first emerged as the centre-half in the 2-3-5, which came to prominence in the 1880s was a multi-skilled all-rounder, defender and attacker, leader and instigator, goal-scorer and defender, but by the early thirties he had all but disappeared as W-M took hold (the last of the old-style centre-halves was probably Ernst Ocwirk, who continued to mastermind the Austria midfield until the early 1950s, but he was very much an anachronism by then).

The old-style centre-half was replaced by the stopper and, as the inside-forwards dropped off to become advanced midfielders, the resulting 3-2-2-3 neatly split midfielders into those whose responsibilities were defensive and those whose were attacking.

Only in the mid-sixties as the four bands of the W-M were replaced by the three bands of 4-2-4, and then old-style 4-3-3 and 4-4-2 – a development that was soon followed by pressing and the squeezing of the game – did the complete midfielder re-emerge.

Now, as three bands once again become four, midfielders are specialising once again.

Gerrard: should have been coached into the best DM in the world, now little more than a hoof and rush merchant.

no club has destroyed as much world class talent as liverpool.

Good read

good read.

QUOTE (Ach @ Oct 28 2009, 03:35 AM)

Good read

even the 17th paragraph?

I'm suspicious tbh

gerrard has the defensive nouse of a carrot. I know he'll play anywhere in a boys own adventure style, but honestly he is all about attacking

Agree. Gerrard's positional sense is way too shit to be a world class DM. He's learned too much of the last ditch defending from Carragher.

QUOTE (hymppi @ Oct 28 2009, 03:50 AM)

interesting stuff for me as i'm not that experienced in footballing tactics.
:goodpost:

Then what the hell are you doing on GW? Everybody out here knows the finer nuances of the game like the back of their hand..

QUOTE (Bearer of Bad News @ Oct 28 2009, 04:53 PM)

this guy is always writing decent tactical articles tbf. such as...

QUOTE

The Question: is the box-to-box midfielder dead?
In the latest in our series analysing football tactics, we look at where the Robsons, Keanes and Matthaus's have gone in the modern game

Doing some research into the 1990 World Cup recently, I was struck by a comment made by the England manager Bobby Robson after his captain, Bryan Robson, had picked up his customary World Cup injury, rupturing an Achilles during the 0-0 draw against the Netherlands. Bryan is, Bobby said, "as good a player as we've ever produced".

As good a player as we've ever produced. Even allowing for the magnifying lens of context, for the sense of despair Bobby Robson must have felt to lose his captain at such a crucial stage – and just when England had produced a performance, if not a result, to rebuff their most poisonous critics – that is an extraordinary statement. Not "he'll be a big loss", not "he's been a key player for us over the years", but "as good a player as we've ever produced".

The stats show the importance of Robson the player to Robson the manager. Bobby was in charge for 88 games. Bryan played in 62 of those, of which England lost only 10; of the 26 he missed, England lost seven. So that got me thinking: if Robson really is one of the best ever, where would he fit in the present England set-up?

And the answer is that he wouldn't, not comfortably, not if England continue to play a loose 4-2-3-1. It seems churlish to define such a great player by what he was not, but did he really have the technical ability to operate in one of the three attacking midfield slots? But equally, given his goal-scoring ability, would it not be a waste to play him as a holding player? And, anyway, until his pace had gone late in his career, did he really have the discipline to operate as one of the holding players?

He would probably have to play in the awkward compromise position Frank Lampard occupied against Slovakia and Ukraine, as the freer of the two holders, alongside a Gareth Barry figure. Which would just about work, I think, and yet it seems terrible to circumscribe the role of a player whose greatest assets were his stamina, his courage and his completeness. And anyway, that role seems best occupied not by a shuttler chafing constantly at the reins, but by an intelligent passer such as Xabi Alonso or Michael Carrick.

And then it occurred to me that complete midfielders, those great drivers of teams who could both score goals and make tackles, are generally a declining breed. After Robson there came Löthar Matthaus, David Platt, then Roy Keane and thereafter, well, nobody. The question is why.

Reason one: The decline of the traditional 4-4-2 formation and the rise of the holding midfielderPerhaps the point is not that complete midfielders don't exist so much as that they are no longer able to play as complete midfielders. Michael Ballack, Cesc Fàbregas and Michael Essien, for instance, have all played this season both as holding midfielders and as attacking midfielders, but rarely, if at all, just as midfielders.

This, surely, is the key issue in the debate over whether Steven Gerrard and Frank Lampard, both of whom would seem to have the full range of attributes that in a previous age would have made them Robson-style box-to-box players, can play together in the same midfield.

In a sense, the problem is less the answer than the question. For what the question omits is the assumption that we're taking about them playing together in the centre of a 4-4-2 (for how, until Fabio Capello opened our eyes, could our players possibly have veered from the one true path of 4-4-2?).

This, arguably, was the main reason for the farrago of the golden generation: England were blessed with a remarkably talented generation of players; the problem was that Michael Owen and David Beckham needed a 4-4-2, while Frank Lampard and Steven Gerrard needed an additional holding player. Neither Sven-Göran Eriksson nor Steve McClaren ever had the clarity of thought to opt for one system over the other and cull players accordingly. It was almost as though football itself were taunting England for its lack of tactical sophistication and its concomitant obeisance to the cult of the celebrity player.

Perhaps in a club situation, working together every day, Lampard and Gerrard could have come to an understanding, but at international level they palpably couldn't. The World Cup qualifier away to Austria in September 2004 showcased the problem. Both Lampard and Gerrard scored, and with 20 minutes to go England seemed comfortable, only for Roland Kollmann to knock in a free-kick conceded by Lampard, and Andreas Ivanschitz to equalise with a drive that deflected off Gerrard and squirmed under David James.

Both goals, ultimately, resulted from the vast space that opened up between back four and midfield as Gerrard and Lampard advanced. That area has always been English football's great weakness. It was from that position that Matthias Sindelar almost exposed England when Austria lost 4-3 at Stamford Bridge in 1932, from that position that Vsevolod Bobrov so tormented Chelsea in their 4-4 draw against Dinamo Moscow in 1945, and, most notoriously, from that position that Nandor Hidegkuti crafted Hungary's 6-3 demolition of England in 1953. Even in the 1990s, Eric Cantona and Gianfranco Zola were able to exploit the stratified nature of the average English set-up, prospering in the space between the lines.

As lone forwards became increasingly common, so it became increasingly necessary for sides to deploy a midfield holder to combat the withdrawn forward, precipitating the gradual shift – at the highest level at least - to 4-2-3-1. Once that formation has been adopted, midfielders are necessarily categorised as either defensive or attacking, and completeness, although it allows a player to play in either role, becomes within the immediate context of the game far less of an asset.

Reason two: modern football is about specialistsThe game nowadays increasingly demands universality. It is no longer enough simply to be a winger or a playmaker or a poacher. Full-backs have to be able to attack. Which makes the decline of the most universal player on the pitch paradoxical.

It also explains the distaste of Arrigo Sacchi – along with Valeriy Lobanovskyi one of the two high priests of universality – for 4-2-3-1. "Today's football is about managing the characteristics of individuals," he said. "And that's why you see the proliferation of specialists. The individual has trumped the collective. But it's a sign of weakness. It's reactive, not pro-active."

Sacchi saw that most clearly during his time as sporting director of Real Madrid in 2004. "There was no project; it was about exploiting qualities," he said. "So, for example, we knew that Zidane, Raúl and Figo didn't track back, so we had to put a guy in front of the back four who would defend. But that's reactionary football. It doesn't multiply the players' qualities exponentially. Which actually is the point of tactics: to achieve this multiplier effect on the players' abilities. In my football, the regista – the playmaker – is whoever had the ball. But if you have [Claude] Makélélé, he can't do that. He doesn't have the ideas to do it, though of course, he's great at winning the ball. It's all about specialists."

Sacchi remains as committed to 4-4-2 now as he was when his AC Milan side won successive European Cups in 1989 and 1990. Neither of his central midfield pairing of Carlo Ancelotti and Frank Rijkaard were as prolific as Robson or Matthaus, but both were certainly capable of both destroying and creating. Given players with the physical and technical attributes of Lampard and Gerrard, he would, presumably, play both in a 4-4-2 – if, that is, they had the mental attributes he demanded. He is not sure that Gerrard, in particular, does.

"When I was director of football at Real Madrid I had to evaluate the players coming through the youth ranks," he said in response to a question about Gerrard. "We had some who were very good footballers. They had technique, they had athleticism, they had drive, they were hungry. But they lacked what I call knowing-how-to-play-football. They lacked decision-making. They lacked positioning. They didn't have that subtle sensitivity of football: how a player should move within the collective.

"You see, strength, passion, technique, athleticism, all of these are very important. But they are a means to an end, not an end in itself. They help you reach your goal, which is putting your talent at the service of the team, and, by doing this, making both you and the team greater. So, situations like that, I just have to say, he's a great footballer, but perhaps not a great player."

Rafa Benítez, who is probably the most Sacchian manager English football has known, seems to have harboured similar doubts. Twice, he was willing to sell his captain (to Chelsea, who would presumably have used Lampard and Gerrard to flank Makelele in a 4-3-3), and his regular deployment of Gerrard on the right or the left of a midfield four was surely evidence of his uneasiness at giving him responsibility in the centre.

It was, of course, the use of Didi Hamann as a holding player that released Gerrard in the 2005 Champions League final, while Benítez's conversion to 4-2-3-1 more recently has given Gerrard licence, because he has two holders behind him. Gerrard started as a complete midfielder, might have become a holding midfielder who get forward, and has become instead an attacking midfielder who can put in the odd tackle.

Lampard's role at Chelsea is slightly deeper-lying, but he is, none the less, more comfortable with a holding player behind him. It will be fascinating to see whether he has the acuity to adapt to the slightly more defensive brief Capello seems to envisage for him with England.

The question then is the extent to which the need to use Gerrard and Lampard in conjunction with more defensive players is a facet of them lacking "knowing-how-to-play-football", and how much it is inherent in the way the tactical evolution of the game has affected the position they grew up playing.

To an extent, the comparison of England's 2004 performance against Austria and a Sacchi side is absurd, for no Sacchi side would ever allow the sort of gap between defensive and midfield lines to open up as emerged in Vienna (something that may, in part, have been caused by the defence's desire to prevent David James, who was having one of his more erratic days, from being tempted into leaving his box).

Reason three: the liberalisation in the offside lawThat said, Sacchi's ideal was for attack and defence to be separated by no more than 25m, providing a compact structure that facilitated his hard-pressing game, and it may be that such a high defensive line is no longer practicable given the liberalisation of the offside law.

It is impossible to prove, but it seems reasonable to suggest that Sacchi's approach would be undermined today as much by the modern interpretation of offside as by the egos of millionaire modern players. The change in the offside law has stretched the game, so we now tend to see it in four bands, and it is that that has effectively decommissioned the complete midfielder.

Historically, that is entirely consistent. The notion of a complete midfielder itself is far from constant across football's history. It first emerged as the centre-half in the 2-3-5, which came to prominence in the 1880s was a multi-skilled all-rounder, defender and attacker, leader and instigator, goal-scorer and defender, but by the early thirties he had all but disappeared as W-M took hold (the last of the old-style centre-halves was probably Ernst Ocwirk, who continued to mastermind the Austria midfield until the early 1950s, but he was very much an anachronism by then).

The old-style centre-half was replaced by the stopper and, as the inside-forwards dropped off to become advanced midfielders, the resulting 3-2-2-3 neatly split midfielders into those whose responsibilities were defensive and those whose were attacking.

Only in the mid-sixties as the four bands of the W-M were replaced by the three bands of 4-2-4, and then old-style 4-3-3 and 4-4-2 – a development that was soon followed by pressing and the squeezing of the game – did the complete midfielder re-emerge.

Now, as three bands once again become four, midfielders are specialising once again.

Gerrard: should have been coached into the best DM in the world, now little more than a hoof and rush merchant.

no club has destroyed as much world class talent as liverpool.

Very interesting - and something that gives me, and the majority of fans who know relatively little about tactics in a general sense, food for thought about AW's committment to having universal players.

QUOTE

"Today's football is about managing the characteristics of individuals," he said. "And that's why you see the proliferation of specialists. The individual has trumped the collective. But it's a sign of weakness. It's reactive, not pro-active."

I love the highlighted comment about what makes a great footballer - where I think that AW may have a bit of a blind spot - or is it too much confidence in his ability to coach that 'subtle sensitivity of football' - methinks probably the latter...in fact the more I think of it, the more this makes sense of his decisions to persist with Diaby; Eboue; Song; Sagna; Clichy; Walcott.

By contrast, Eduardo; RVP (learning); Rosicky; Cesc; Arshavin (when bothered); Nasri; Vermaelen; Bendtner all have this 'sensitivity'.

I think its do-able, but wenger just isnt that sort of technical beast for me.

send diaby, song and gerrard to ac milan at 16 and you'd have vieira, yaya toure and matthaus today. no chance the continents top-dogs would have let diaby and gerrard dick about as attacking midfielders with their attributes.

in fact yaya toure is a top example. the boys a tactical master. kolo is pretty much a headless chicken.

QUOTE

Arsene Wenger has heaped praise on striker Robin van Persie by comparing him to former Gunners greats Thierry Henry and Dennis Bergkamp.

The Dutch international scored twice in yesterday’s 3-0 win over neighbours Tottenham Hotspur at the Emirates to take his tally for the season to seven.

His good form has been warmly welcomed by Wenger who admitted he was vital to Arsenal’s hopes of success this season.

"He is the kind of player, with the type of game we play, who is vital because when you play the ball to his feet his first touch is always perfect and that allows others to join in," the Frenchman is quoted by the Press Association as saying.

"It makes everybody dangerous. In the box he is clever and intelligent."

The Arsenal boss also likened his striker to both Henry and Bergkamp revealing he saw qualities of both forwards in Van Persie’s play.

Wenger added: "He is a mixture. He is less of a runner than Thierry Henry and he is not completely Dennis Bergkamp because he plays higher up the pitch."

this season so far has caused me to rate RVP more and more. And I don't think he's playing at his best either. This isn't, for him, particularly great form; it feels like it's just his medium-level.

at the same time, I've begun to rate Torres a bit less (and he also seems to be injury-prone one these days).

Outside of Drogba-in-full-flow, I don't know that I'd trade RVP for anyone in the world. The only possibilities from the prem would be Rooney or Torres or Clint Dempsey. And from other leagues, Villa, Ibra, or Benzema -- and the last only because of his promise. Oh, and Chamakh, needless to say.

QUOTE

Robin van Persie scored twice to take his tally for the season to eight goals in all competitions. The Arsenal forward clearly relishes the rivalry with Tottenham. “It always feels good to beat Spurs,” he said. “It even feels good when we don’t play them and they get beaten, so it’s especially good when we’ve played them.”

He keeps going up and up in my estimation. What a legend.

RVP :bow:

No penalties either, which I felt kind of bumped up his tally last year. He's well on course to top 20. RVP is massively important for us right now. He's been injury free for while and we're reaping the rewards. Touch wood it remains that way.

QUOTE

It took him a little time but Robin Van Persie is now flying in his new role as Arsenal’s main striker.

The Dutchman admitted to finding the central position a ‘lonely’ one in the opening weeks of the campaign and failed to find the net in his first five appearances.

But Van Persie broke his duck with a supreme finish at Manchester City in September and has not looked back. His North London derby brace on Saturday took his tally to eight in the last nine games.

So why has it suddenly gone so right for Robin? He explained why in an exclusive interview with the Official Matchday Programme.

“In the last four or five weeks I’ve felt much better,” he said.

“I’ve had to get used to the new role because I previously played as a second striker and now I’m operating as a main striker, so I needed to find my way in.

“To my mind, earlier in the season I lost too much energy working defensively and needed to find the right balance. It’s really important for the team that I have enough energy to score goals and make assists, as well as helping out in other ways.

“I feel that in the last few weeks I’ve found that mix, of having the energy to do my offensive work and contribute defensively.

“It was hard in the first few weeks to really find my way – the second striker and striker are very close to each other on the pitch but at the same time there’s such a difference, a massive difference, between the two roles.

“ I like it because it’s a new challenge for me and if you look at the results and the personal stats of almost every player, everyone has improved with the new system.”

He looks more like a centre-forward now than I ever thought he would tbh. Him attacking the near post for a cross was pretty much unheard of. And the two goals on Saturday weren't pretty but all down to being in the right place in the area

Didn't see him pulling the role off but it's working so far.

Agreed.

The 2 goals he scored on saturday are the types of goals ive been wanting a striker to score for ages hence my constant call for a striker.

Now if RVP can keep this up, we might only need the one striker

Agreed. I guess that's football intelligence for you.

By contrast - your Diaby's and Eboue's of this world are unlikely to adapt to unfamiliar roles.

it not really that unfamiliar a role, its not like a right back being shunted to the left wing (eboue).

besides, the "new bergkamp" tag was always a red herring. his link play was never going to be good enough to be a top second striker.

hes playing in his natural position, and hes playing it well.

QUOTE

ROBIN VAN PERSIE insists he should not be considered a "real killer" in front of goal like Fernando Torres and Didier Drogba.

The Arsenal striker — currently preparing for Holland's friendly against Italy — has fired seven Premier League goals this season to propel his side to second in the table.

But despite his recent prowess in front of goal, Van Persie does not believe his game is similar to his Liverpool and Chelsea counterparts.

He said: "I don't see myself as a true out-and-out striker. Guys likes Fernando Torres and Didier Drogba, they are real killers.

"I try to bring my own dimension to the forward position.

"I feel I play between a target striker and a shadow striker. I am a combination of both and that's just fine.

"In the league I have now contributed seven assists and I am just as proud of these as the seven goals I have scored.

"I find it crucial to be effective in both spheres for the team."

The Dutchman puts his modesty down to instructions from boss Arsene Wenger.

He added: "The coach is particularly keen that I add something to the tactical play of the team, both offensively and creatively, that I use and combine with the players around me.

"It is my main intention to help others play.

"I am also free to make myself more dangerous. It took a while before I had found the balance."

Read more: http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/sport...l#ixzz0Wf74CQIs

I love to watch Van Persie play.

His technique is (a manly) beautiful to watch. What he does with his first touch takes others 3 touches to do. He controls it, shields it and shifts it in one fluid move.

Brilliant player...just not the devastating player, in the mould of Torres/Eto/Drogba et al some think/want him to be.

For the football purists though, he's right up there!

It's all buzz-words with RVP. IMO, in most of his interviews, he rarely says anything of substance.

But as long as he keeps scoring, he can say whatever he wants tbf.

QUOTE (Syn @ Nov 12 2009, 05:20 PM)

It's all buzz-words with RVP. IMO, in most of his interviews, he rarely says anything of substance.

Show me an itelligent interview with any footballer from the past 100 years and I'll show you something funny by Alan Carr.

[YOUTUBE]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-cgfzaCja2c[/YOUTUBE]

Talking about RVP check this one..

user posted image

What a screamer, sign him up Wenger :scarf:

Is that RVP's kid or a random?

All kids are randoms

QUOTE (Der_Kaiser @ Nov 13 2009, 10:59 PM)

Is that RVP's kid or a random?

Shaqueel "11" Van Persie :good:

The way he hit the ball is copy cat RVP :coffee:

View Full Version: RVP's role explained