Title: Analysis of the July 7th Review Committee
Description: .... work in progress ....
Description: .... work in progress ....
The Antagonist - February 27, 2006 01:08 AM (GMT)
It's 58 pages long, it's got lots of information so here's a thread for discussion and analysis of the information contained in the July 7th Review Committee Transcript and any subsequently issued documents and information.
There's too much information to throw into one post so, for now at least, there'll be a bunch of individual posts rather than one extended one.
I'll fill out this initial post with background information later but feel free to post replies with your own comments and observations in the interim....
There's too much information to throw into one post so, for now at least, there'll be a bunch of individual posts rather than one extended one.
I'll fill out this initial post with background information later but feel free to post replies with your own comments and observations in the interim....
The Antagonist - February 27, 2006 01:10 AM (GMT)
Here's Tim O'Toole's explanation of how it came to be that power surges were reported instead of bombs:
| QUOTE |
| Tim O’Toole (Managing Director, London Underground): The first manifestation of an incident was simply that there was no traction current there and there had been an activation of the tunnel telephones in the Piccadilly Line tunnel. ‘Power surge’ is perhaps not a correct engineering term, but it was shorthand for a problem with the power system or traction current system. It was chosen because there was an assumption, since there were reports of loud bangs, that there had to have been a power surge that was part of what happened resulting in these loud bangs. A 22kV (kilovolt) cable letting loose, or a very large circuit breaker firing can produce a loud bang. That is simply why at that moment that term was chosen by the Network Control Centre. Soon thereafter, as those further calls came in there was an appreciation that something else had happened, however that description was still apt for the circumstances we were confronting. We did not have power on the north side of the Circle Line and we needed to move people off the network. Source: J7RC Transcript, Page 6 |
A 'cable letting loose' can produce 'loud bangs' (which is what a lot of survivor accounts described as hearing, as opposed to definite statements that an 'explosion' was heard).
| QUOTE |
| TUBE LOG SHOWS INITIAL CONFUSION ... At 09:09, an engineer reports losing a high tension power cable between Mansell Street and Moorgate. Source 1: BBC News Source 2: The Telegraph |
Cables letting loose can produce loud bangs and at 0909 (leaving around 19 minutes to investigate what had happened at 0850) an engineer reports the loss ('letting loose'?) of a high tension power cable at Moorgate. On the morning of July 7th, Scotland Yard was reporting seven blast locations, which included Moorgate and Aldgate East.
On pages 7 and 8 O'Toole again confirms the time at which they first knew something more serious than previous large-scale power incidents but without specifiying the specific nature of the severity:
| QUOTE |
| Joanne McCartney (AM): Can you clarify whether you were aware at 9.15am when you took the decision to evacuate the system, that these were explosions that you were dealing with as opposed to power surges? When was the exact moment you became aware, or the police were aware, that it was an explosives incident? Tim O’Toole (Managing Director, London Underground): We were aware that there were explosions and that this was something well beyond what we had experienced two years earlier when we did lose a bulk supply point and had to deal with [Page 7] the loss of power from the National Grid, as you will recall. We knew there were explosions. We did not spend a great deal of time, I have to say, framing the description of exactly what had happened and who was involved, but we knew that this was off the charts and that it was most likely the worst nightmare of a terrorist incident. [page 8] |
The Antagonist - March 23, 2006 12:02 AM (GMT)
A question to the mayor with respect to CCTV on July 7th.
| QUOTE |
| Mayor answers to London 7th July attacks [Main question] Question number 1721/2005 Meeting date 14/09/2005 Question by Geoff Pope Was there any CCTV footage on the Tube trains of the 7th July attacks? Answer by Ken Livingstone (2nd Term) I am that there is no CCTV coverage 'within' the tube trains in respect of the 7th July attacks. However, London Underground is cooperating fully with the investigations in to the July 7 attacks and the attempted attacks on July 21. London Underground has provided extensive amounts of CCTV from both stations and trains to aid the police with their investigations into the incidents of both July 7 and 21. Source: London Assembly |
The Antagonist - April 12, 2006 01:46 PM (GMT)
For the first time in nine months, someone hints at there being some sort of motivation for what happened to the diverted bus in Tavistock Square:
| QUOTE |
| Beverli (King’s Cross/Russell Square) Thank you, Assembly, and thanks for being generous with your time today, and for the invitation to come and speak to you. I was a senior project consultant working for a consultancy firm based in Lynton House in Tavistock Square en route to an Olympic Delivery Committee (ODC) meeting that had been announced the previous day. I was travelling into town on the Underground on the Piccadilly Line, going into head office for that meeting. On that particular day, for once in my life, I was actually on time. I was on the way to the office when all this took place. Currently, I am unemployed. I relocated to Norwich so I did not have to deal with town, and also the Underground or trains. Coming in today was my third time on a train since the incident. Currently I am also in part-time study. I am doing a doctorate in intelligent transport systems. My injuries include maxillo-facial injuries, which I have had an operation for already; severe PTSD; dysphasia – I will apologise in advance if I stumble over my own words; temporomandibular joint (TMJ) injury; short-term memory loss; and other neurological ailments, which as yet remain undiagnosed, because we have not been able to get an magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) appointment. We are going privately now, in the next couple of weeks, and we are hoping to get to the bottom of the diagnosis quite soon. With regard to my own personal situation, the fellow survivors pretty much have their own personal accounts which are very similar to my own story. I will not bore you with additional information. In order to assist myself with getting through the tragedy, I have started writing a book with my own experiences to clear my emotions and to set things straight. I had found out about the Charlotte Street organisation (trauma stress clinic), and did attend, and only recently found out about the King’s Cross United website. I have also read through your terms of reference regarding the agenda for today. In order to approach it in a more structured manner, I will deal with the three areas that have been requested on the agenda, which were: 1) how information, advice and support were communicated to Londoners; 2) how business continuity arrangements worked in practice; 3) the use of information and communication technology to aid response in the process. If you do not mind, I will try to stick to that for you. With regard to the 7 July incident, this was not my first experience of a first large-scale emergency. I was also involved in the (7 September 1999) earthquake in Greece, which was one of the strongest earthquakes that they had experienced, and involved emergency procedures to evacuate the city. On the day, when I got upstairs, after moving ourselves from the situation, I tried to use 112, which is the single emergency telephone number, which was established in 1991 to govern all emergencies throughout the European Union (EU). Obviously this is a specific service directed for emergencies only, which were like the earthquake in Athens, and other types of emergencies like natural disasters and fires and also terrorist attacks. As only one in five Europeans is aware of 112, one of the fellow survivors said why was I dialling 112 and not 999. I mentioned that it is a large-scale type of attack; it is best to dial to 112. The service centre will then direct assistance to the UK particularly§. I was also unsure whether I would be able to dial right through, and I was unable to secure a connection at that time, because the lines were busy. I did manage to call my office. At the time of calling, the bomb had just been discharged outside our reception area. My colleague was on his way into the office for the same meeting I was going to – and the bomb went off. I said, ‘What on earth was that?’ He said, ‘You are not going to believe this, but a bomb has just gone off on a bus, and I am covered in glass.’ I said, ‘Where?’ He said, ‘Outside the office. I am standing outside Lynton House.’ I said, ‘Why?’ He said, ‘I do not know. I am going to see if I can help people.’ That is when he said, ‘Do not come into the office. Get home. Just get home.’ That was it, and I never heard from him again. I subsequently realised that the reception area was going to be used as the triage area for those that were on the bus. A lot of my colleagues went downstairs and helped to pull people off the bus, and clear debris and assist where they could. When I got off the Underground and managed to make my way towards a near safer area, it appeared that the critical infrastructure protection had failed. On speaking with other LU staff, it was mentioned that overall training for the event was either verbal briefings, which included how to deal with suspicious activity in parcels or baggage, and some had fire experience. Other one-to-one briefings included touching on terrorist attacks, but they were not really adequately trained. I believe that this has been over a subsequent period of time; they are not actually sent away to be trained in terrorism activities. GLA Secretariat note: calls to 112, the single European emergency call number, from within the UK are automatically transferred to a 999 emergency call centre. In view of the level of preparedness, I do believe that the staff were extremely brave, kind and clear-headed. We have called them the angels on the Underground; they certainly were my personal angels. The British Transport Police (BTP) seemed to use above and below ground in deep Tubes – different types of the new airwave system. That might have been used to maintain contact with ambulance and emergency crew. They were also using portable drums with cables from the Underground, which went to the surface. That appeared to take longer, but it seemed it was in a relatively short period of time, once everything had got going. Surface side, I expected more loudhailers than there were, and I also expected electronic boards or further additional communications. None of that was present at all. Maybe my expectations as a businesswoman were far higher than what London could actually achieve at that time. Disaster mitigation of risk and measures for mobilising hospitals and placing Accident & Emergency (A&E) units on standby were specifically lacking, particularly at Chase Farm, Barnet and Edgware hospitals, where staff were expecting to be placed on alert but were not placed on alert. I would have thought that logically, looking at the Piccadilly Line, particularly towards the end of the line you have King’s Cross, Southgate, Oakwood and all those other stations. That would have been my logical approach – to put all of those hospitals on standby, because many, many people travel from those areas every single day into town to work, just like myself. None of them was on alert; they were not expecting us at all as walking wounded. They failed to deal with incoming patients; we were not seen on time. The walking wounded were not seen in acceptable time. I had since found a taxi with a number of other lady survivors. The taxi driver at the time said to me, ‘Listen, love, I am not taking credit cards or cheques or anything. You have to give me cash. I want cash to get out of the city.’ Between us, we managed to pool £46.50, which was the exact fare to the top of the A10. We got to the top of the A10 and were promptly ousted from the taxi and were told to, ‘Get on your bike and walk,’ and we did. Once we got past the A10 we all separated and started calling our respective partners for assistance to come and collect us. My partner then luckily managed to find me wandering down the road like a dithering idiot. Relief operations did reduce the loss of life, but reduced the track-and-trace capabilities of survivors. With reference to the walking wounded, they were sent home to their closest A&E, with absolutely no data in existence to track and trace us or assist us later. The widespread outage on the telecommunications side, sustained the interruption of mobile services, which reduced emergency telecommunications – even 112 was not contactable. The public protection and disaster communication call requirements did not appear to be in place, from my view, that is. This is only my opinion. Communications between emergency services and authorities were undertaken by runner, which was a human individual running physically between two areas to carry crucial messages. They were not even phoning each other; they were not using broadcast materials; they were not texting. They were using a body – a human person – to physically run between one area to the next to give information, which I thought was appalling. It appeared that joint emergency telecommunications had failed on a large scale. The aftermath communications in London I found lacking. When asked for medical assistance, the NHS Direct answered questions, but redirected me to local A&E – once again, lacking. Crucial MRI scans were not undertaken, resulting in private MRIs to be scheduled six months later. Advice on the symptoms of PTSD was forthcoming from the London Bombings Relief Charitable Fund, who kept in touch on a weekly basis, and offered advice and support, which later became involved with my GP and eventual clinical diagnosis, and later a lifeline facility. Luckily, I was the only survivor within my GP’s practice, and he was very sympathetic, and he was able to offer me substantial time. Sometimes, he was also frustrated at the length of the waiting lists and the requested procedures within the NHS. He then fought to try to have some of the procedures brought forward to no avail. Further support in allowing zero prescription fees to all survivors would be of great help. My prescriptions so far have cost me over £300, and I will be on this medication for the rest of my life if I intend to even stand up straight. I was told that any private medical fund, in respect of British United Provident Association (BUPA), with which I have had a significant policy, would not entertain any claims from me, as it was an act of terrorism. I have spoken to one of their directors, and they have stated categorically, ‘Sorry, it was for the NHS to deal with. We will not be paying any of your claims, so do not even try.’ I cancelled my BUPA. NHS waiting lists do not support the 7 July survivors’ initiative. There was no system in place to deal with us super-fast, super-quick; we are just one of the masses. With regard to Item 2, which is how business-continuity arrangements worked in practice, business-continuity arrangements did not work in practice. The consultancy in Lynton House was designated a crime scene. I understand the police had to do their job, but then we had no dial-in; we could not dial in successfully. The Information Technology (IT) helpdesk was overrun; broadband was overrun; the servers fell over. We were understaffed, and the servers were totally inadequate. Passing through police cordons to try to get in the office added an extra two to four hours to your journey, which was already painful. I was then determined to get to work in spite of the pain and the fear, and obviously extensive medication. The health and safety officer took one look at me and said, ‘That is it. You are going home. There is no point going into work.’ The lack of business continuity affected my job performance directly and caused a trail of negative events, impacting on my overall performance of my duties within the consultancy firm, which was already suffering from downtime at Lynton House, Tavistock Square, as it was part of the bomb site from the bus. As a result of the bus bombing, I feel that I might have been the only person physically affected by the train bomb, but also damaged professionally by the bus bomb, due to the lack of business continuity. The cross-examination, also, by Scotland Yard, made me feel like a suspect, and it was extremely hard, unfeeling, and it felt threatening. With regard to the European citizens’ rights to know about 112 and how it can save their lives, I feel that this communication technology was not utilised to aid the response process. I would imagine half of Britain are not aware of 112. I think something needs to be done on that score. Text services were expected, but not received. I did however receive some scores and sporting results, which I do not usually get, but that was interesting – not much use though. The use of information technology systems (ITS) was similar to that of a third-world country. Having lived all over the world and worked and consulted all over the world, I really did expect more from London. Interactive survivors’ lists were an expectation. I was on that list until about five o’clock, and then I managed to phone in to say I was actually okay, or reasonably okay, and head in towards A&E. Text services to those requiring medical attention – I expected that; they were not forthcoming. Broadcast, or webcast, or medical, services, or a web link to tell us where to go or which hospitals have been mobilised, where you could go for assistance, who you could talk to – nothing. None of those services was forthcoming; they do exist; they have existed since 1991. There is an emergency telecommunications procedure throughout the EU Directive since 1991, and renegotiated 2003 and 2004. As a member state, we would have been aware of it in the UK. I have double-checked that; none of that was utilised. I hope that my commentary on events has motivated the authorities to act at all levels, and that action groups will ensure the safety of all peoples in the future. With regard to myself and other treatments, I do feel, within the NHS, that I have been fobbed off, with the particular result of other areas of my life being affected. I did note that Kirsty had mentioned that there was no assistance regarding the legality in the workplace of individuals like myself, who came under scrutiny. There is assistance to those who have lost their jobs as a direct result of the 7 July incident, who potentially could be classified as disabled. If PTSD has been in existence for over one year, you are then entitled to a particular process with various departments in order to make your claim in an employment tribunal. Whether they have actually dismissed you or not, my suggestion is that you do not resign under any circumstances at all. With regard to that, I would like to mention at this time that I was not allowed to talk to the police or talk to anybody regarding my findings or experiences, as being an individual involved with or having experience of both the Russell Square/King’s Cross and also Tavistock Square, within the office. We were told as staff, that we were banned from talking to anyone – particularly the press, which was an immediate dismissal offence – police, or anything regarding the experience. I was, at that time, afraid for my job and my position to speak out or even come forward. My conscience, however, was pricking me and, of course, my partner was also doing exactly the same thing. At my partner’s insistence, I called the police line anonymously, and requested that there might be a connection between the bomb outside our offices and our involvement in the Olympic bid, as the upper level of the bus was at exactly the same level as our boardroom where the bomb went off. I did not leave my name and I did not comment any further. As far as that goes, I feel that perhaps I could have assisted a little bit further in mentioning more of my involvement but, because we were told not to speak, I was fearing for my job. Finally, to all who have assisted in the recovery, condolences as well to those who have lost their loved ones, also, from myself and my family, a very big thank you. |
The offices in Lynton House were declared a crime scene (what did the police suspect had happened within?) and Beverli faced instant dismisall if she talked to the press (fairly understandable) or the police (not understandable unless the corporate interests of whomever Beverli worked for are greater than those of 'the largest criminal investigation English history'). Beverli also says, "as the upper level of the bus was at exactly the same level as our boardroom". Well, take a little look-see at these photos and wonder if the boardroom is the same room that's got one window open and one window propped open at a time when the top deck is loaded with people:
numeral - April 13, 2006 07:14 PM (GMT)
| QUOTE |
| EC Harris HQ turned into medical centre after bus explosion Construction consultant EC Harris had a narrow escape last week after the Tavistock Square bus blast happened metres away from its front door at Lynton House. The 500 who work in the building escaped injury, but several are suffering from shock. Philip Youell, group chief executive of EC Harris, described the lack of injury as ‘miraculous’. ‘We had so many near misses. Everyone could feel the impact of the explosion but no one was hurt and the building did not suffer structural damage.’ Company employees trained in first aid responded to the explosion by treating the injured and in shock. EC Harris’s lobby was used as a triage to judge how badly people were hurt before treatment in the back rooms. Doctors from the neighbouring British Medical Association building also helped treat victims in the building. Youell said about 15 people were treated in the offices. ‘Our guys were outstanding and the police highly commended them.’ The firm has organised coun... http://www.property-week.co.uk/issueIndex....issueCode=12094 |
Bridget - May 29, 2006 10:54 PM (GMT)
| QUOTE |
| 7/7 Revealed: the missing kit and poor planning that put lives at risk Doors did not open, phones did not work, first aid boxes were empty and staff unprepared, an inquiry into the London bombings rescue effort will say. Sophie Goodchild reports Published: 28 May 2006 A catalogue of communication failures undermined the "heroic" efforts of emergency crews, doctors and commuters to rescue victims injured in the London bombings. The official inquiry into the response to the disaster has found that the recommendations made nearly two decades ago, after the King's Cross fire, have not been acted on. The three-volume report, which includes the harrowing testimonies of survivors, will make more than 50 proposals for improving the handling of major emergencies. The members of the 7 July review committee, who will present their findings to ministers on 5 June, are expected to warn that lives could be lost in future unless action is taken immediately. Fifty-two people died and many more were injured when Islamist extremists launched a series of suicide bomb attacks at Edgware Road, King's Cross and Aldgate Tube stations and on a double-decker bus. Those involved in the attempt to save badly injured passengers displayed heroism "beyond the call of duty" but were let down by inadequate equipment, a lack of medical supplies and insufficient training for a terror attack, the 7/7 inquiry will conclude. One Whitehall source, who has seen a draft of the report, said: "If people had not gone far beyond what they were expected to do then it [the number of casualties] would have been an awful lot worse. Individuals acted with heroism even if the technology did not always back them up." The areas of concern that will be highlighted in the 7/7 report include: Communications Officials relied too heavily on communicating by mobile phone, the review committee is expected to say. It will call for an alternative to mobiles in a crisis. On 7/7, the mobile phone networks were deliberately shut down to enable officials carrying phones with special SIM cards to reach staff. It has now emerged that some senior managers did not have these. The networks also failed because of traffic overload, adding to the widespread confusion. Ambulance crews' radios also failed and radios did not work underground. It has emerged that it will be another two years before a new digital radio system is introduced, although this was one of the main recommendations made after the King's Cross fire disaster. First Aid Witnesses told the inquiry that despite the great response by emergency services, staff were hindered by a lack of medical supplies. As they rushed to help the injured, they discovered that many of the boxes carrying first aid equipment on Tube carriages were empty and others could not be unlocked. Ambulances were also short of basic equipment such as bandages and tourniquets and there was not enough safety equipment for emergency crews who went into the tunnels. The 7/7 inquiry will highlight the fact that lack of funding contributed to these shortages. Lack of key personnel Casualties were ferried to only a handful of London hospitals, because of communication breakdowns. Overstretched staff were not prepared for the extent of the injuries. Great Ormond Street, where some victims were taken, does not have an emergency department, so its staff would not have been expected to be involved in a major incident. Not prepared Many Tube workers had not received specific training to deal with terror threats. London Underground says that it does now give its employees regular training. Walking wounded The inquiry report will highlight the failure by police to follow guidelines in the official emergency manual on how to take details from witnesses. Some of the injured ending up walking miles away from the disaster scene without their details being taken by officers. One commuter said they tried eight times to give their name and address to an official. Another was told to go home and watch television. The emergency number for casualty information did not work properly and was charged at national rate, a criticism which has been acknowledged by the Metropolitan police. Jammed doors Train doors could only be forced open a few inches and emergency lighting underground was poor, making the impact of the Tube bomb blasts hard to determine and hampering the rescue operation. Mental trauma The 7/7 review committee will say that psychological support for traumatised victims was "haphazard". Many were unable to access proper help. The report will call for an overhaul of procedures to ensure people receive the support they need to alleviate long-term problems. The emergency services say they are already working to improve communications so that they are better prepared in the event of another disaster like the 7 July bombings. The London Ambulance Service said that it has reorganised its major incident control room so that it can deal more effectively with major incidents. "The events of 7 July were unprecedented and the courageous and professional actions of our staff and their colleagues from other agencies undoubtedly saved lives," said Martin Flaherty, the director of operations. "We have been open about the fact that managers were over-reliant on mobile phones, and we have since provided them with pagers which are more resilient during major incidents." The 7/7 committee is planning to follow up its report in November, to see whether on this occasion its recommendations have been implemented. Additional reporting by Carlo Svaluto Moreolo |
numeral - September 14, 2006 11:17 PM (GMT)
Inside the LUL Network Control Centre:
| QUOTE |
| Kim ______ – NCC Operator, Network Control Centre On Thursday morning July 7, I was on the Incident desk in the Network Control Centre. The day had not started well, with a security alert closing Bank Monument and a defective train suspending Northern line services south of Stockwell. As the peak progressed, things were getting steadily worse; the Piccadilly line part-suspended due to a smell of burning from a train at Caledonian Road; a person ill on the train at Bank on a northbound Northern line and then a suspected main line burst on a northbound Bakerloo line train at Piccadilly Circus. But amongst NCC staff, the talk was still very much of London’s unexpected 2012 Olympic bid win the previous day, with even sceptics like myself admitting a little bit of wry national pride at the news. At around 08.50 however the S/S (Station Supervisor) at Liverpool Street called to say they were evacuating after hearing a ‘loud bang’. Shortly afterwards, I got a similar message from Aldgate and then from the S/S at Edgware Road (the following day’s inaccurate media reports timing the latter bomb as 20-odd minutes later). Next, we were being flooded with calls reporting loss of signal, main and traction current and that equipment like escalators, UTS gates and POMS (Passenger Operated (ticket) Machine)/TOMS (Ticket Office Machines) had failed. These were not just from H&C stations but also many other remote from there. Around the same time, the Network Duty Ops Manager took a call saying a train had hit a tunnel wall at Edgware Road, possibly involving another train and that there might be a person under one of these two trains. I began contacting the emergency services (in conjunction with colleagues) and arranging for them to attend these sites. The next thing was a report of smoke coming from a Piccadilly Line tunnel at King’s Cross and this resulted in more calls to the emergency services. The power supply people at Leicester Square confirmed that they had lost one of their major supply routes and were preparing an alternative feed, thus it looked in part that things were similar to the major power failure 2 years’ ago (albeit now caused by a train severing HT cables and with more serious consequences). The NCC, therefore, issued the “Network Power Failure” blanket message for trains to await traction current recharge, and it’s galling to see how in the media and on the internet the “power surge” theory is being described as an MI5 or Government cover-up put out to avoid panic. Although confirmation that these were terrorist acts had not yet been received, the Information Desk Operator and myself between us rung all London area Train Operating Companies (TOC) to explain the current LU-status and suggested to each TOC that they might wish to review their own security arrangements. Senior managers began arriving in the NCC and the ‘Gold Control’ function was established in an adjacent room. Once the bus bombing had been confirmed it proved out worst fears, though by this time the evacuation of the entire system had already commenced. Buses were being withdrawn from Zone 1 and National Rail trains terminating short of the capital. With virtually the entire inner London public transport network halted, an incoming phone enquiry led me to see if the Thames boat services were still running. I found the phone number of one of their senior managers on the intranet and rang it by chance. Luckily he answered, because it turned out that not only were they still operating but had abandoned fares and were running extra shuttles between some of the inner London piers too. So we put this out to stations in an attempt to offer customers some alternative where possible. With the LU system now closed, the amount of phone calls started to drop off and those that there were, many were now being dealt with by the ‘Gold’ team. At this stage, I don’t think many of us were aware of the true magnitude of the situation or the injuries/fatalities, in particular as almost all of that morning’s events had taken place in tunnels and away from the camera. On the other hand, I know that early on into the incident I had a sense I was becoming involved in something big that would be remembered long afterwards (though for what reasons I wasn’t sure). I was conscious that adrenaline kicked in once the gravity of events began to dawn on us all (perhaps at the point the London Ambulance Service (LAS) told me they’d declared ‘major incident’ at four different locations). I finally got off the desk around 17.40 and then faced the task of getting home. With the Underground closed and buses only just coming back into central London, I decided to walk to Westminster Pier on the Embankment. People were queuing to board the river services, with each passenger being searched by Met Police Marine Division officers. The trip along the Thames was surreal, with a mix of apprehensive commuters and oblivious tourists for company. The London Eye had been evacuated and on many buildings, flags were flying at half-mast. I had a feeling that life in London might never be the same again, or at least for many years, yet couldn’t quite take it all in (the adrenaline was still buzzing). On arrival at Tower Pier I faced a further walk, finally getting home around 19.50. The NCC had worked well as a team that day and it felt good to have been a part of it, but it all seemed so different to the hopeful mood of 18 hours’ earlier when I’d been on the Information Desk and had broadcast the result of the 2012 bid to Underground staff on the Breakdown Broadcast Messaging System (BBMS). |
Report of the 7 July Review Committee
Volume 2: Views and information from organisations
amirrortotheenemy - November 14, 2006 01:00 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (numeral @ Apr 13 2006, 07:14 PM) | ||
|
Elisabeth Airey is a director for both EC Harris and AMEC Plc
EC Harris has also worked with three other Kingstar clients - Balfour Beatty, Birse and Wates.
Source:
EC Harris launches online Safety Health & Online system
numeral - November 17, 2006 08:31 PM (GMT)
| QUOTE |
| 7 July Review Committee, 2pm on 22 November 2006 Please find below a link to the agenda for the 7 July Review Committee meeting on 22 November 2006, at 2pm in the Chamber, City Hall. The agenda includes the written responses we have received to the Committee's reoprt of June 2006. If you would like a hard copy to be sent to you, please let me know. Committee members will question senior representatives from the following organisations to discuss progress on implementing recommendations of the Committee’s Report on lessons learned from the 7 July report: Transport for London * Metropolitan Police Service * British Transport Police * City of London Police * London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority * London Ambulance Service * NHS London * The meeting is open to the public and you are welcome to attend. There is access for disabled people, and induction loops are available. If you have questions, would like further information about the meeting or require special facilities, please contact either me or Dale Langford, Committee Administrator, tel 020 7983 4415; email dale.langford@london.gov.uk, Minicom: 020 7983 4458. http://www.london.gov.uk/assembly/resilien...ov22/agenda.jsp Best wishes Janet Hughes |
The Antagonist - July 16, 2007 12:51 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (amirrortotheenemy @ Nov 14 2006, 02:00 AM) | ||||
Elisabeth Airey is a director for both EC Harris and AMEC Plc EC Harris has also worked with three other Kingstar clients - Balfour Beatty, Birse and Wates. Source: EC Harris launches online Safety Health & Online system |
I don't suppose you've got a copy of the rest of the Property Week article to hand do you, amtte?
Bridget - July 16, 2007 01:01 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (The Antagonist @ Jul 16 2007, 01:51 AM) | ||||||
I don't suppose you've got a copy of the rest of the Property Week article to hand do you, amtte? |
| QUOTE |
| The firm has organised counsellors to treat its own employees for shock. One partner was caught underground near the King’s Cross explosion and suffered from smoke inhalation. Richard Clare, chairman of EC Harris, who was in Liverpool when the bomb exploded, said: ‘Our office is still a serious crime scene but work is back to normal. It was an amazing escape for our company. There were so many horrifically injured people who were helped by our first aiders.’ |
The Antagonist - November 18, 2007 06:17 PM (GMT)
| QUOTE |
| Richard Barnes (Chair): The Civil Contingencies Act has a chapter on what has to be done within the first hour, such as notification of the media and the quality of information. Are you suggesting that first hour is far too tight a period? Sir Ian Blair (Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Service): The phrase we use is ‘the golden hour’, but it is not that literally. Richard Barnes (Chair): I deliberately avoided it. Sir Ian Blair (Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Service): It literally is not 60 minutes; it is the first wave of response. That is certainly the way I have seen that guidance. I will just go back to the point that we had planned and we had rehearsed, and those plans and rehearsals went into effect. I remember speaking to an assistant fire chief who had been at the Edgware Road scene. He had been there quite quickly and when he came back up he said that it was quite eerie and that it really did feel like an exercise. The cordons were in place, all the equipment was there and it was being dealt with in the way it would have been dealt with in an exercise, which I think is a good sign. |