Title: 2001 Anthrax Attacks
freedomfiles - September 23, 2006 02:46 AM (GMT)
The 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States, also known as "Amerithrax" from its FBI codename, occurred over the course of several weeks beginning on September 18, 2001 (a week after the September 11, 2001 attacks). Letters containing anthrax bacteria were mailed to several news media offices and two U.S. Senators, killing five people and sickening seventeen others. The crime remains unsolved.
The anthrax attacks came in two waves. The first set of anthrax letters had a Trenton, New Jersey postmark dated September 18, 2001, exactly one week after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Five letters are believed to have been mailed at this time, to ABC News, CBS News, NBC News and the New York Post, all in New York City; and the National Enquirer at American Media, Inc. (AMI) in Boca Raton, Florida. Robert Stevens, the first person who died from the mailings, worked at a tabloid called Sun, also published by AMI. Only the New York Post and NBC News letters were actually found; the existence of the other three letters is inferred from the pattern of infection. (Some unconventional theories of the case do not posit five letters). The anthrax found in the New York Post letter is reported to have become damp before being discovered. Scientists examining the anthrax from the New York Post letter said it appeared as a coarse brown granular material looking like Purina Dog Chow.
Two additional anthrax letters, bearing the same Trenton postmark, were dated October 9, three weeks after the first mailing. The letters were addressed to two Democratic Senators, Tom Daschle of South Dakota and Patrick Leahy of Vermont. More potent than the first anthrax letters, the material in the Senate letters was a highly refined dry powder consisting of approximately one gram of nearly pure spores. Some reports described the material in the Senate letters as "weaponized" or "weapons grade" anthrax. The Daschle letter was opened by an aide on October 15, and the government mail service was shut down. The unopened Leahy letter was discovered in an impounded mail bag on November 16. The Leahy letter had been misdirected to the State Department mail annex in Sterling, Virginia, due to a misread Zip code; a postal worker there, David Hose, contracted inhalation anthrax.
Twenty-two people developed anthrax infections, eleven of the life-threatening inhalation variety. Five died of inhalation anthrax. In addition to the death of Robert Stevens in Florida, two died from unknown sources, possibly cross-contamination of mail: Kathy Nguyen, a Vietnamese immigrant, a resident of the borough of the Bronx who worked in New York City; and Ottilie Lundgren, a 94-year old widow of a prominent judge from Oxford, Connecticut, who was the last known victim. The two other deaths were employees of the Brentwood mail facility in Washington, D.C., Thomas Morris Jr. and Joseph Curseen.
Thousands of people took a two-month course of the antibiotic Cipro in an effort to preempt anthrax infections. The Associated Press reported that members of Vice President Dick Cheney's staff took Cipro on the night of the September 11 attacks as a precaution, a week before the first anthrax attack.
As of 2006, the anthrax investigation seems to have gone cold. Authorities have traveled to four different continents, interviewed more than 8,000 individuals and have issued over 5,000 subpoenas. The number of FBI agents assigned to the case is now 21, ten fewer than a year ago. The number of postal inspectors investigating the case is nine.
The FBI and postal inspectors are in the process of preparing an internal report reviewing the history of the investigation. The report will include a list of "persons of interest" and the latest on the scientific tests used on the anthrax material. Investigators still have not determined the lab used to make the anthrax.
A "person of interest"
The Justice Department has named no suspects in the anthrax case. Although Attorney General John Ashcroft labeled Dr. Steven Hatfill a "person of interest" in a press conference, no charges have been brought against him. Hatfill, a virologist, has vehemently denied he had anything to do with the anthrax mailings and has sued the FBI, the Justice Department, John Ashcroft, Alberto Gonzales, and others, for violating his constitutional rights and for violating the Privacy Act. He has also sued The New York Times and its columnist Nicholas D. Kristof and, separately, Donald Foster, Vanity Fair, Reader's Digest, and Vassar College, for defamation. (The case against The New York Times was initially dismissed, but was reinstated on appeal. Nicholas Kristof has been dropped from the suit.) Hatfill's lawyers believe the Privacy Act was violated and continue to question journalists who have reported on their client.
The anthrax
The letters contained at least two grades of anthrax material; the coarse brown material sent in the media letters and the fine powder sent to the two Senators. In addition, it has been suggested the anthrax material sent to the National Enquirer and then forwarded to AMI may have been an intermediate grade similar to the anthrax sent to the Senate. The brown granular anthrax sent to media outlets in New York City caused only skin infections, cutaneous anthrax. The anthrax sent to the Senators caused the more dangerous form of infection known as inhalation anthrax, as did the anthrax sent to AMI in Florida. Although the anthrax preparations were of different grades, all of the material derived from the same bacterial strain. Known as the Ames strain, it was first researched at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. The Ames strain was then distributed to at least fifteen bio-research labs within the U.S. and six overseas.
2nd New Jersey postal worker tests positive for anthrax
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/condit.../10/19/anthrax/
Accused scientist says letter links to anthrax mailers
http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030809-110412-5744r.htm
Anthrax Alarm
What had been a public-health probe in Florida is now a criminal investigation
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3067576/
Anthrax Attacks, One Year Later
http://www.npr.org/news/specials/anthrax2002/index.html
Anthrax closes 2nd D.C. postal facility
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/condit...hrax/index.html
Anthrax fears shake world
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1600696.stm
Anthrax Found in Gov. Pataki's NYC Office
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewNation.asp?Page...T20011017c.html
Anthrax Hits Daschle's Staff Hard
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,47649,00.html
Anthrax Investigation A 'Cold Case?'
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/18/...in2019769.shtml
Anthrax is 'weapons grade'
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1601754.stm
Anthrax Killed Postal Workers
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1614835.stm
Anthrax Probe Shuts Army Lab
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/08/05/...ain634257.shtml
Anthrax sent to Senate leader
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1601093.stm
Anthrax spores found in Boca Raton post office
http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2001/1...oca-anthrax.htm
Anthrax Strain in Daschle Letter 'Very Refined'
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,36610,00.html
Anthrax whodunit: Is it a cold case file?
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1110/p09s02-coop.htm
Army Lab Eyed As Anthrax Source
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/28/...ain513694.shtml
Closing of lab marks renewed intensity in anthrax probe
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/health/ba...ealth-headlines
FBI anthrax probe revisits former Detrick researcher
http://www.boston.com/news/local/connectic...ick_researcher/
FBI draining Maryland pond in anthrax probe
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/South/06/09...hrax/index.html
FBI links anthrax-laden letters to Brokaw, Daschle
http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2001/10/17/letters.htm
FBI searches apartment in anthrax probe
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/08/01/anthrax.investigation/
FBI Took Coolers From Anthrax Investigation
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,129331,00.html
FBI: Hijacker-anthrax link coincidental
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/condit...hrax.hijackers/
Federal workers to take polygraphs in anthrax case
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/05/21/anthrax.htm
Investigators hunt for source of rare anthrax
http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2001/10/10/anthrax.htm
Leahy: Anthrax letter could have killed 100,000
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/no...11-25-leahy.htm
Lie detector testing expands in anthrax probe
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/05/21/anthr...ex.html?related
No Anthrax in Daschle Letter
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/01/03/...ain323015.shtml
Postal workers plan anthrax lawsuit
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/conditi...nthrax.lawsuit/
Ravaged by Anthrax, Postal Facility Reopens
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A...anguage=printer
Researcher quizzed again in anthrax probe
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/US/05/17/anthr...robe/index.html
Tests confirm anthrax in letter to Daschle
http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2001/10/16/lede.htm
Third person shows exposure to anthrax
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/10/10/anthrax/
Two Trenton postal workers tested for anthrax
http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2001/10/15/trenton.htm
Trenton, NJ Becomes Anthrax 'Ground Zero'
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewNation.asp?Page...T20011022c.html
freedomfiles - December 16, 2006 10:20 PM (GMT)
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| 2001 Anthrax attack on US Congress made by scientists and covered up by FBI, expert says by Sherwood Ross Middle East Times - 2006-12-11 http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?con...&articleId=4129 The terrorists who perpetrated the 2001 anthrax attack on Congress likely were US government scientists at the army's Ft. Detrick, MD., bioterrorism lab having access to "moonsuits" that enabled them to safely process and manufacture super-weapons-grade anthrax, an eminent authority on the subject says. Although only a "handful" of scientists had the ability to perpetrate the crime, the culprit among them may never be identified as the FBI ordered the destruction of the anthrax culture collection at Ames, IA., from which the Ft. Detrick lab got its pathogens, the authority said. This action makes it impossible "to pin-point precisely where, when, and from whom these bio-agents had originated," said Dr. Francis A. Boyle of the University of Illinois at Champaign. Boyle, who drafted the US Biological Weapons Convention of 1989 enacted by Congress, said destruction of the Ames anthrax "appears to be a cover-up orchestrated by the FBI." If impartial scientists could have performed genetic reconstruction of the anthrax found in letters mailed to Senators Daschle (D-S.D.) and Patrick Leahy, (D -Vt.), "the trail of genetic evidence would have led directly back to a secret but officially-sponsored US government biowarfare program that was illegal and criminal" in violation of biological weapons conventions and US laws, Boyle said. "I believe the FBI knows exactly who was behind these terrorist anthrax attacks upon the United States Congress in the Fall of 2001, and that the culprits were US government-related scientists involved in a criminal US government biowarfare program," Boyle said. The anthrax attacks killed five people, including two postal workers, injured 17 others, and shut down the operations of the US Congress. Boyle, a leading American authority on international law, said after the attacks he contacted senior FBI official Marion "Spike" Bowman, who handles counter-terrorism issues, and provided him with the names of the scientists working with anthrax. Boyle told Bowman the Ft. Detrick scientists were not to be trusted. In addition to then destroying the anthrax, the FBI "retained every independent life-scientist it could locate as part of its fictitious investigation, and then swore them all to secrecy so that they cannot publicly comment on the investigation or give their expert opinion," Boyle said. Boyle pointed out that Bowman is the same FBI agent "who played a pivotal role in suppressing evidence which in turn prevented the issuance of a search warrant for the computer of Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged 20th Al Qaeda hijacker on 11 September 2001, which might otherwise have led to foreknowledge and therefore prevention of those terrorist attacks in the first place." A self-confessed Al Qaeda operative, Moussaoui was detained on immigration three weeks before 9/11 when a Minnesota flight school reported he was acting suspiciously. Boyle asked if Bowman received an FBI award in December 2002, for "exceptional performance" because of his capacity "to forestall investigations, because of where they may lead?" He went on to inquire, "Could the real culprits behind the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, and the immediately following terrorist anthrax attacks upon Congress ultimately prove to be the same people?" Because of its "bogus investigation," Boyle said, "the greatest political crime in the history of the United States of America since its founding on 4 July, 1776 - the anthrax attacks on Congress, which served not only to deliver a terrorist threat on its members, but actually to close it down for a period - may remain officially unresolved forever." "Could it truly be coincidental," he continued, "that two of the primary intended victims of the terrorist anthrax attacks - Senators Daschle and Leahy - were holding up the speedy passage of the pre-planned USA Patriot Act ... an act which provided the federal government with unprecedented powers in relation to US citizens and institutions?" Leahy is incoming Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee and may have a personal interest in holding hearings to learn who tried to kill him. He recently said President George W. Bush should be "terrified" that he will be the new Chair. Boyle's views are contained in his book Biowarfare and Terrorism, published by Clarity Press, Inc., of Atlanta, GA. His previously published titles include, Foundations of World Order, The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence, and Destroying World Order. Dr. Boyle holds a Doctor of Law Magna Cum Laude and a Ph.D. in political science, both from Harvard. In a forward to the book, Dr. Jonathan King, Professor of Molecular Biology at M.I.T. and a founder of the Council for Responsible Genetics, said the government's "growing bioterror programs [described by Professor Boyle] represent a significant emerging danger to our own population." A harsh critic of Pentagon biowarfare activities, Boyle pointed out in inflation-adjusted dollars the US spends more on them today than it did on the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb in World War II. He has accused the Bush administration of diverting the bio-tech industry "towards biowarfare purposes" and of making corrupting payoffs to Academia to turn university scientists to the pursuit of biowarfare work. Sherwood Ross is an American journalist who writes on military and political topics. Reach him at sherwoodr1@yahoo.com |
Bridget - March 11, 2007 10:36 PM (GMT)
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| Tables Turned In Anthrax Investigation "Person Of Interest" Files Lawsuit Against FBI March 9, 2007 Quote "I believe ... they wanted the public to believe that they ... were making great progress in this case." Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa (CBS) They followed him. They brought bloodhounds into his home. The attorney general identified him to the world as a "person of interest" in the first major bioterrorism attack in the nation's history. But five years after letters sent through the U.S. mail containing anthrax killed five and injured 17, the FBI has yet to charge Dr. Steven Hatfill. In 2003, he sued the government. The resulting depositions of FBI personnel and law enforcement records obtained by 60 Minutes provide an inside look into one of the FBI's biggest investigations ever and raise the possibility that the bureau may have a cold case on its hands. Correspondent Lesley Stahl's report, which contains revelations from those depositions, will be broadcast this Sunday, March 11, at 7 p.m. ET/PT. Hatfill, a scientist who worked at an Army laboratory where the strain of anthrax used in the attacks was stored, is the only "person of interest" named publicly in the case. He has maintained his innocence all along. Hatfill is suing the government for destroying his reputation by, among other things, naming him "a person of interest." According to depositions taken for Hatfill's suit and obtained by 60 Minutes, the FBI official who oversaw the investigation says the bureau was looking at many more people. "There were 20 to 30 other people who were also likewise identified as 'persons of interest' in the investigation,' " the FBI's Richard Lambert says under oath. 60 Minutes has learned that today at least a dozen of those other people still have not been eliminated as so-called "persons of interest." Hatfill charges in his suit that the FBI leaked information about him that was distorted and damaging. After the deadly mailings, evidence-sniffing bloodhounds reportedly "went crazy" at Hatfill's apartment, according to a Newsweek story. 60 Minutes has learned that the bloodhounds reacted similarly at the home and office of another scientist, too. And two of the dogs have been wrong on a number of occasions, including a serial rape case in which a man in California was arrested and jailed, based largely on the evidence from the dogs. He was ultimately exonerated with DNA evidence. To quell the leaks, FBI Director Robert Mueller instituted a tactic known as "stovepiping," whereby the various squads assigned to the case stopped sharing information with one another. In his deposition, the FBI's Lambert said he opposed Mueller's order because barring investigators from exchanging information " would inhibit our ability to 'connect the dots' in a case of this magnitude " just as it had leading up to 9/11. Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, agrees that stovepiping undercut the investigation. He also charges that the FBI used the leaks to cover a lack of progress in the case. "I believe they wanted the public to believe that they were making great progress in this case," he tells Stahl. "It's just turning out to be a cold case." 60 Minutes has also learned that the FBI's biggest hope to crack the case turned out to be a dead end created by one of its own investigators. Early on in its investigation, the bureau was able to lift trace amounts of DNA from one of the envelopes used in the attacks. Agents hoped this forensic evidence would hold the key to solving the crime. But the amount of DNA recovered was so minute the bureau decided not to test it, fearing that doing so would use up the sample without yielding results. The FBI then improved its DNA-testing technology so it could accurately test the microscopic sample. They then discovered that the DNA belonged to one of its own investigators who had contaminated the envelope. |
The Antagonist - March 28, 2008 09:51 PM (GMT)
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| FBI Focusing on 'About Four' Suspects in 2001 Anthrax Attacks Friday, March 28, 2008 By Catherine Herridge and Ian McCaleb WASHINGTON The FBI has narrowed its focus to "about four" suspects in the 6 1/2-year investigation of the deadly anthrax attacks of 2001, and at least three of those suspects are linked to the Armys bioweapons research facility at Fort Detrick in Maryland, FOX News has learned. Among the pool of suspects are three scientists a former deputy commander, a leading anthrax scientist and a microbiologist linked to the research facility, known as USAMRIID. The FBI has collected writing samples from the three scientists in an effort to match them to the writer of anthrax-laced letters that were mailed to two U.S. senators and at least two news outlets in the fall of 2001, a law enforcement source confirmed. The anthrax attacks began shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks, further alarming a nation already reeling from the deaths of 3,000 Americans. Five people were killed and more than a dozen others were infected by the deadly spores in the fall of 2001. A leading theory is that the anthrax was stolen from Fort Detrick and then sealed inside the letters. A law enforcement source said the FBI is essentially engaged in a process of elimination. Much of the early public focus fell on a Fort Detrick scientist named Steven Hatfill, who is suing federal authorities for identifying him as a person of interest. Now the FBI is focusing on other scientists at the facility. |
Bridget - June 29, 2008 08:02 PM (GMT)
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U.S. settles with anthrax mailings subject Steven Hatfill for $5.82 million Scientist Dr. Steven J. Hatfill once worked at the Army bioresearch lab at Fort Detrick, Maryland. "There is not a scintilla of evidence that would indicate that Dr. Hatfill had anything to do with this," said U.S. District Court Judge Reggie B. Walton, after reviewing four still-secret FBI memos about the anthrax investigation. Prosecutors said the payout means that the former Army scientist will likely never be charged in connection with the deaths of 5 people who came in contact with the deadly spores. By David Willman, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer June 28, 2008 WASHINGTON -- The former Army scientist who was the prime suspect in the deadly 2001 anthrax mailings agreed Friday to take $5.82 million from the government to settle his claim that the Justice Department and the FBI invaded his privacy and ruined his career. Dr. Steven J. Hatfill, 54, who was called a "person of interest" in the case by then-Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft in 2002, said that label and repeated leaks of investigative details to the media damaged his reputation. For months in the anxious atmosphere after Sept. 11, Hatfill was subjected to 24-hour surveillance and was widely identified as the leading suspect in the nation's first bioterrorism attack. However, he was never arrested or charged and a federal judge presiding over his lawsuit said recently that there "is not a scintilla of evidence" linking him to the mailings. Former federal prosecutors knowledgeable about the investigation said the government payout to Hatfill signified that, in all likelihood, he would never be charged. A spokesman for the Justice Department said the anthrax case "remains among the department's highest law enforcement priorities." Brian Roehrkasse also said in a statement that by agreeing to settle the lawsuit, the government "does not admit to any violation of the Privacy Act and continues to deny all liability in connection with Dr. Hatfill's claims." The settlement calls for an immediate $2.82-million payment to Hatfill. Beginning in 2009, the government will pay Hatfill an annuity of $150,000 a year for 20 years, according to court papers. Hatfill's lawyer, Thomas C. Connolly, said that his client would have no comment on the settlement. "We took this case to defend very fundamental principles of fairness," Connolly said. Another lawyer for Hatfill, Mark A. Grannis, said Friday: "If anybody in the country really knew what it was like to be Steven Hatfill for the past six years, nobody would trade places with him." Grannis faulted "a handful of credulous reporters," who he said published or broadcast government leaks of "gossip, speculation and misinformation." The lawsuit was filed in August 2003, but U.S. District Court Judge Reggie B. Walton delayed permitting Hatfill's lawyers to question FBI and Justice officials or news reporters for two more years. The government contended that the depositions of agents and FBI leaders could interfere with the investigation. Connolly and Grannis oversaw depositions that eventually elicited sworn testimony from 37 witnesses, including Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III. Hatfill's lawyers told Walton at a January hearing that they had identified three officials who allegedly leaked confidential information. The officials -- former U.S. attorney for Washington, Roscoe C. Howard Jr.; his former criminal division chief, Daniel S. Seikaly; and a former FBI spokesman, Edwin Cogswell -- have not spoken publicly on the allegation. At that hearing, Walton ordered attorneys for the government and for Hatfill to try to settle the case. On Feb. 19, he signaled that he saw the government's pursuit of Hatfill as questionable. The judge had reviewed four still-secret FBI memos about the status of the anthrax investigation. "There is not a scintilla of evidence that would indicate that Dr. Hatfill had anything to do with this," Walton said. Hatfill was trained in Zimbabwe as a physician and practiced medicine in South Africa. He later worked at Ft. Detrick, Md., researching how to counter the effects of deadly biological agents. No physical evidence or witnesses ever linked him to anthrax and he long insisted that he had nothing to do with the mailings. Those mailings -- hand-addressed letters bearing tiny amounts of deadly anthrax powder -- set off new waves of terror in the weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks. The first letter arrived at American Media Inc. in South Florida. About Sept. 18, photo editor Robert Stevens, 63, breathed in spores of the bacterium while examining a letter. He died Oct. 5. Other letters laced with the same strain of anthrax were addressed to others in the media, including two network anchors. Two letters were addressed to U.S. senators. Of the five anthrax-related deaths, two were U.S. Postal Service workers in the Washington area. Hatfill's plight recalls the targeting of Richard Jewell, a guard at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics who alerted police to a suspicious backpack and moved bystanders away. The backpack exploded, killing a woman and injuring more than 100. Jewell was praised; then media accounts described him as "the focus" of the FBI investigation. Another man later confessed. Then-Atty. Gen. Janet Reno apologized to Jewell, who died last year. Rep. Rush D. Holt (D-N.J.), whose district includes Princeton, where anthrax spores were recovered from a mailbox, said the government's payout to Hatfill confirmed that the investigation "was botched from the very beginning." "The FBI did a poor job of collecting evidence, and then inappropriately focused on one individual as a suspect for too long, developing an erroneous 'theory of the case' that has led to this very expensive dead end," Holt said in a statement. LA Times |
numeral - June 29, 2008 08:18 PM (GMT)
^
The LA times fails to mention any of this.
The LA times fails to mention any of this.
numeral - August 1, 2008 06:10 AM (GMT)
Yet another dead microbiologist.
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| Anthrax scientist commits suicide as FBI closes in By LARA JAKES JORDAN and DAVID DISHNEAU Associated Press Writers WASHINGTON (AP) - A top U.S. biodefense researcher apparently committed suicide just as the Justice Department was about to file criminal charges against him in the anthrax mailings that traumatized the nation in the weeks following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, according to a published report. The scientist, Bruce E. Ivins, 62, who worked for the past 18 years at the government's biodefense labs at Fort Detrick, Md., had been told about the impending prosecution, the Los Angeles Times reported for Friday editions. The laboratory has been at the center of the FBI's investigation of the anthrax attacks, which killed five people. Ivins died Tuesday at Frederick (Md.) Memorial Hospital. The Times, quoting an unidentified colleague, said the scientist had taken a massive dose of a prescription Tylenol mixed with codeine. Tom Ivins, a brother of the scientist, told The Associated Press that another of his brothers, Charles, told him Bruce had committed suicide. A woman who answered the phone at Charles Ivins' home in Etowah, N.C., refused to wake him and declined to comment on his death. ``This is a grieving time,'' she said. A woman who answered the phone at Bruce Ivins' home in Frederick declined to comment. Justice Department spokesman Peter Carr and FBI Assistant Director John Miller declined to comment on the report. Henry S. Heine, a scientist who had worked with Ivins on inhalation anthrax research at Fort Detrick, said he and others on their team have testified before a federal grand jury in Washington that has been investigating the anthrax mailings for more than a year. Heine declined to comment on Ivins' death. Norman Covert, a retired Fort Detrick spokesman who served with Ivins on an animal-care and protocol committee, said Ivins was ``a very intent guy'' at their meetings. Ivins was the co-author of numerous anthrax studies, including one on a treatment for inhalation anthrax published in the July 7 issue of the journal Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy. --- Dishneau reported from Hagerstown, Md. |
numeral - August 1, 2008 07:42 AM (GMT)
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| Elaboration of Bacillus anthracis Antigens in a New, Defined Culture Medium Infect Immun. 1983 January; 39(1): 483486. PMCID: PMC347970 Elaboration of Bacillus anthracis Antigens in a New, Defined Culture Medium Joseph D. Ristroph and Bruce E. Ivins U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland 21701 Abstract Improved culture conditions and a new, completely synthetic medium (R medium) were developed to facilitate the production of Bacillus anthracis holotoxin antigens. Levels of these antigens up to fivefold greater than the highest previously reported values were recovered with the described system. Cultures of Sterne, V770-NP1-R, and Vollum 1B strains of B. anthracis were monitored for growth, pH change, glucose utilization, supernatant protein concentration, lethal toxin activity, and protease activity. |
numeral - August 1, 2008 07:50 AM (GMT)
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| Beyond the Breach TIMELINE From start to finish, we trace the steps in Fort Detrick's 2002 anthrax breach and detail USAMRIID's rapid response Monday, April 8, 2002: # 9 a.m.: Potential exposure occurs In a sworn statement, a USAMRIID principal investigator said he was working in a laboratory with flasks containing anthrax and noticed they were leaking. The investigator reports the potential exposure to personnel in the suite. One worker suggests he visit the health ward. He and another investigator visit the medical division, which swabs both individuals' noses and prescribed Ciprofloxacin, an antibiotic used to prevent bacterial infections. One person's nasal swab tests positive for anthrax, but both individuals had been previously vaccinated against anthrax. Wednesday, April 10: USAMRIID's medical division confirms the investigator's nasal swabs are positive for anthrax. Thursday, April 11: USAMRIID tests areas near the biocontainment suite in which the exposure took place. The tests show anthrax contamination in several areas, including the inside handle of the passbox. Monday, April 15: USAMRIID microbiologist Dr. Bruce Ivins takes unauthorized samples outside the laboratory containment areas. Dr. Ivins tests more than 50 samples from the men's change room, the area outside the passbox and his office. He finds heavy growth of Ames-strain anthrax, a pathogenic, or disease-causing, form of the agent, on rubber molding surrounding the non-containment side of a passbox. In his office area, he finds Ames anthrax spores. The men's change room tests positive for Ames spores and a few colonies of Vollum 1B, a pathogenic form of anthrax. Tuesday, April 16: Dr. Ivins tells the USAMRIID Bacteriology Division chief of the preliminary results of the anthrax contamination. USAMRIID begins testing for contamination in and around the passbox and the cold side of the female change room area. Thursday, April 18: The USAMRIID Bacteriology Division chief reports the findings to USAMRIID's deputy commander and acting commander, Col. Erik Henchal. # 2 p.m.: The USAMRIID safety office learns of the contamination # 3 p.m. to 6:15 p.m.: USAMRIID analyzes suspicious colonies and decontaminates previously positive areas. Subsequent testing shows the decontamination successfully removed the anthrax spores. USAMRIID officials' tests show small numbers of strains Ames and Vollum 1B, as well as Sterne, a non-pathogenic strain used in vaccines, in Dr. Ivins' office. A sample taken near the BSL-3 passbox tests positive for more than 200 spores of Ames-strain anthrax. # 4:15 p.m.: Lt. Col. Kathleen Carr informs USAMRIID Commander Col. Edward Eitzen and USAMRMC headquarters of the potential contamination. # 7 p.m.: Fort Detrick Commanding General Maj. Gen. Martinez-Lopez and the USAMRMC public affairs officer are contacted. Friday, April 19: # 8:30 a.m.: USAMRMC principal parties meet and formulate a press release. USAMRIID notifies its workforce, then-Mayor of Frederick Jennifer Dougherty and the Jeanne Bussard laundry facility, which handles linens from USAMRIID's clean change rooms. # 10 a.m.: USAMRIID holds meetings with its workforce and counsels them to go to USAMRIID's medical clinic if they are concerned they may be contaminated. Two workers visit the medical division clinic; 15 are tested using nasal swabs and seven were put on preventive antibiotics. All swabs test negative for anthrax. # 12 p.m.: USAMRIID staff meets to discuss a sampling plan. # 2 p.m.: Sampling process begins. USAMRIID collects 838 samples in Building 1425. Two samples test positive for the non-pathogenic Sterne anthrax strain used in vaccines. # 3 p.m.: U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventative Medicine staff arrives to help in sampling process # 5 p.m.: USAMRIID principal staff meets to discuss evening sampling plan and a press release. # 5:30 p.m.: Surveys in phase I are completed. Phase II surveys begin. # 8:50 p.m.: Someone from USAMRIID calls Rep. Roscoe Bartlett. He says USAMRIID had blown the incident out of proportion and that publicizing the incident gives terrorists an advantage. He asks to have the soil on his farm tested. Saturday, April 20: # 9 a.m.: The USAMRIID team, Maj. Gen. Martinez-Lopez and CHPPM meet. Maj. Gen. Martinez-Lopez suggests USAMRIID issue a policy letter mandating anyone doing environmental sampling have approval by USAMRIID headquarters and coordinated with the safety office. Maj. Gen. Martinez-Lopez says the USAMRIID areas in question should have been closed off Thursday night rather than early Friday. # 9:50 a.m.: Mr. Bartlett arrives at USAMRIID, concerned of anthrax contamination on his private property near Buckeystown. Later soil tests are negative for anthrax. # 6 p.m.: CHPPM collects samples from the Jeanne Bussard laundry facility. CHPPM finds no contamination at the laundry facility. Sunday, April 21: # 8 a.m.: At a USAMRIID meeting, tells the group the spores isolated from the nasal swab exposed in the BSL-3 containment lab April 8 are not the same type of spores as those found outside the lab, de-linking the two findings Maj. Gen. Martinez-Lopez says because of the suspicious nature of those findings, he orders an investigation. He reiterates a need for USAMRIID to institute a system of checks and balances for future incidents and a need to enforce a routine sampling program. # 1:50 p.m.: states samples from the Jeanne Bussard laundry facility and USAMRIID maintenance shop and incinerator appear non-pathogenic. # 2:40 p.m.: USAMRIID removes tape blocking BSL-3 area. # 2:56 p.m.: All 54 samples taken from the Jeanne Bussard laundry facility and USAMRIID maintenance shop and incinerator are negative for contamination. : CHPPM samples previously positive areas and a maintenance area. A single colony from the men's clean change room and a single colony from a bookcase in Dr. Ivins' office are positive for virulent anthrax. Monday, April 22 # 9 a.m.: USAMRIID meets with Directorate of Installation Services personnel, firefighters, contractors, Provost Marshal Office, cleaning crew and laundry personnel. The meeting is a question and answer session. # 1:30 p.m.: Sterilization begins of all lockers inside the men's change rooms. # 4:05 p.m.: USAMRIID contacts the Maryland Department of Public Health to consult on notification process to local and state health officials. Tuesday, April 23 # 9:15 a.m.: The Army Safety Office and U.S. Army Medical Command Safety Office ask for an investigation on the lag in reporting. # 10 a.m.: Col. Eitzen attends a press conference with USAMRMC and Fort Detrick representatives, hosted by Ms. Dougherty. # 12 p.m.: The Department of the Army Safety Office said it intends to investigate the gap in reporting time of recent incidents. Thursday, April 25 # 8:30 a.m.: Decontamination and re-sampling of the men's change room. All tests are negative for anthrax. # 3:30 p.m. to 5 p.m.: Various groups meet to discuss safety and sampling plans and policies. The group discusses a need to emphasis safety reporting within three hours of notification, using the chain of command, and the need for an in-house risk communication plan. # 5:05 p.m.: All samples of the Jeanne Bussard laundry facility taken by an independent civilian hazardous materials team April 20 are negative. Friday, April 26 # 4 p.m.: BSL-3 office and change room are cleared for re-occupancy. As of April 26, the medical clinic has evaluated 88 people and collected swabs from 57. No swabs tested positive for anthrax. The clinic placed nine people on antibiotics -- seven Jeanne Bussard workers or supervisors, one USAMRIID facilities management worker and one CHPPM team member. |
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| Anthrax slip-ups raise fears about planned biolabs Posted 10/13/2004 10:29 PM Updated 10/14/2004 3:21 AM By Dan Vergano and Steve Sternberg, USA TODAY Bruce Ivins was troubled by the dust, dirt and clutter on his officemate's desk, and not just because it looked messy. He suspected the dust was laced with anthrax. And he was in a position to know. Ivins, a biodefense expert, and his officemate were deeply involved in Operation Noble Eagle the government's response to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks that killed almost 3,000 Americans and the anthrax attacks that killed five more less than a month later. It was December 2001. Ivins, an authority on anthrax, was one of the handful of researchers at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, Md., who prepared spores of the deadly bacteria to test anthrax vaccines in animals. He knew enough to grow alarmed when his officemate complained, as she had frequently of late, about sloppy handling of samples coming into the lab that could be tainted with anthrax. "I swabbed approximately 20 areas of (her) desk, including the telephone computer and desktop," Ivins later reported to Army investigators. Half of the samples, he found, "were suspicious for anthrax," betraying the clumpy brown appearance of anthrax colonies under a microscope. Rather than reporting contamination to his superiors, Ivins said, he disinfected the desk. "I had no desire to cry wolf," he later told an Army investigator. Months later, Army investigators would see Ivins' desk cleanup as the first sign of an alarming anthrax contamination at the nation's most renowned biodefense laboratory. A 361-page U.S. Army report on the events of that winter and the following spring, recently obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request, opens a rare window into the government's guarded biodefense establishment. (Related: Where labs are located or planned) Today, the view from that window frightens critics of the government's plans to establish similar labs in urban centers throughout the country. They say it's too dangerous to bring deadly microbes into populated areas. In July, hundreds of Boston-area scientists and activists marched to oppose plans to construct a biodefense lab at Boston University. Supporters say such facilities are needed to fight bioterrorism. But the new safety concerns echo fears expressed in late 2001 and early 2002 after anthrax spores, too small for the naked eye to see, escaped from a supposedly secure lab suite and into the scientists' offices. Within USAMRIID, 88 people were eventually tested for exposure to anthrax. The incident also raised fears that anthrax had leaked into nearby Frederick, Md. Anthrax spores are infectious, and they're potentially deadly for years. When spores get into the skin, they cause pus-filled blisters that burst to form black scabs. Hence the name anthrax, from the Greek word for anthracite coal. Untreated skin infections are fatal about 25% of the time. Spores can be ingested in spoiled meat or inhaled in the air. Without prompt treatment, gastrointestinal and inhalation anthrax will kill you. Researchers express relief that no one was hurt or killed in the episode, but Stephanie Loranger of the Federation of American Scientists asks, "Fort Detrick is one of the premier biodefense labs, and if they have problems, what does it mean for all the others?" A time of turmoil December 2001 was almost two months after the inhalation-anthrax death of tabloid photo editor Bob Stevens in Atlantis, Fla. Stevens' death was the first from five anthrax-laced letters that infected 22 people, hobbled the U.S. postal system and shut down the Hart Senate Office Building in Washington after Sen. Tom Daschle, D-S.D., received one of the letters. The person who sent the deadly envelopes has never been caught. It was a frantic time at the biodefense lab. The criminal investigation, dubbed Amerithrax by the FBI, was in full swing and USAMRIID was the only national laboratory giving authorities round-the-clock biodefense analysis, spokeswoman Caree Vander-Linden says. The six-member team that worked in the lab equipped to handle anthrax had swollen to a staff of 85. Most had to learn how to handle the bacteria "on the fly," says USAMRIID's commander Col. Erik Henchal, who headed the forensic effort. As many as 70 researchers slept in cars or on cots as they scrambled to keep up with a deluge of specimens flooding the lab. Over roughly eight months, USAMRIID researchers ran tests on 30,000 suspect envelopes, packages and other items that arrived at the lab. They also tested about 320,000 environmental samples from such places as the Hart Senate Office Building and Washington, D.C.'s Brentwood postal center, which lost two employees exposed to the lethal letters. (In addition to the Florida victim and the postal workers, an elderly woman from Oxford, Conn., and a Vietnamese immigrant from New York City were killed.) "They were running just fantastic numbers of (anthrax) samples," says biodefense expert D.A. Henderson of the University of Pittsburgh. "I'm not sure what they have accomplished is appreciated." In April 2002, four months after Ivin's initial suspicions, the contamination resurfaced. A microbiologist spotted the liquid slurry in which anthrax is grown leaking from flasks inside a secure lab suite. He reported the episode up the chain of command, which set off alarms throughout the lab. Ivins did more tests. This time he found that three strains of anthrax had escaped the supposedly secure "Biosafety Level 3," or BL-3, laboratory, which is designed to enable scientists to safely work with deadly microbes. Two of the strains were used in biodefense work. One of them may have come from the envelope sent the previous October to Daschle's office. Powdered anthrax from the Daschle envelope so readily surfed currents of air that it frightened USAMRIID experts who opened the envelope. "The good news is nobody got the disease," says Alan Zelicoff, a biodefense expert who is now a consultant at ARES Corp., a risk analysis firm. "The bad news is that nobody got the disease because just about everybody near the BL-3 suite had been vaccinated." It was during that period, as the anthrax investigation gained momentum, that Ivins' officemate "repeatedly expressed concern to (Ivins) that she may have been exposed to anthrax spores when handling powder," according to the Army's report. The leak inside the BL-3 lab was found on April 8. Over the next two weeks, Ivins and other researchers tested lab surfaces to confirm the extent of the contamination. Eighteen lab workers were tested for anthrax exposure. Nasal swabs from one of them tested positive for anthrax. Army officials acknowledged the incident in an April 19 press release. Anthrax was found in three places outside the containment lab. Colonies of two anthrax strains were found in the "clean change room" where male scientists disrobe before showering and donning sterile suits to enter the secure lab suite. The strains were Sterne, a benign form used in inoculations, and Vollum 1B, once Fort Detrick's signature bioweapons strain. Vollum 1B was grown from the blood of lab microbiologist William Boyle, who died after inhaling anthrax in a 1951 lab accident, hence the B in the name. Further away from the lab suite, researchers found three strains of anthrax in the office called B-19 that Ivins and his colleague shared: Sterne, Vollum 1B and Ames. Ames is now the preferred strain for biodefense research and was the strain found in the Daschle letter. Their tests also found more than 200 colonies of Ames strain on the lab's "passbox." The passbox is a 2-foot-square ultraviolet-bathed portal a blue glow emanating around the edges of its door used for safely passing potentially contaminated material into and out of the laboratory suite. Fears in the community As the investigation continued, word was leaking out. On April 20, USAMRIID officials got irate calls from Frederick's mayor and a visit from local U.S. Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md., who told Army investigators that he thought the incident was being "blown out of proportion" and "gives the terrorists an advantage." Bartlett also wanted his nearby horse farm tested for anthrax. One day later he showed up at the lab, bearing a soil sample from his farm, which turned out to be negative for anthrax. He now says the public was never at risk and the lessons learned from the episode have made USAMRIID's safety standards stronger. Fear that spores had escaped into the community in USAMRIID's dirty laundry prompted officials to dispatch technicians to the base's laundry at the Jeanne Bussard Center, a rehabilitation center for the developmentally disabled in Frederick. One laundry worker's doctor had already called the base to query about the exposure risk. On April 20, the team collected 32 samples to test for possible anthrax contamination. Nothing was found. The formal probe of how the contamination occurred began April 24, led by an Army investigator from Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. In 20 interviews over two weeks, investigators learned that some lab workers had been concerned about possible exposure for months, beginning with the botched handling of the Daschle letter that sent 16 people to the infirmary for preventive antibiotics. By the time the investigation drew to a close, about 1,120 sites in the lab, the off-site laundry and the laundry's delivery vans had been tested. About 90 people had been evaluated for exposure, and many of them treated with preventive antibiotics. No one became ill and no other traces of anthrax were found. Military investigators concluded that the Sterne and Vollum 1B colonies had probably persisted in Building 1425 for years, perhaps as far back as the U.S. offensive biowarfare program ended by President Richard Nixon in 1969. The Ames strain likely escaped the lab because workers didn't thoroughly decontaminate shipping containers with fresh bleach. USAMRIID's Henchal suspects that a researcher who handled a poorly decontaminated container may have spread the Ames spores outside of the containment area. A question the report leaves unanswered is whether that Ames strain came from the Daschle letter, which would elevate the episode to a higher level of concern. "It is a little ambiguous," says C.J. Peters, of the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, formerly one of USAMRIID's experts on deadly microbes. "If this is from the (Daschle) powder, it could be re-aerosolized and somebody could get hurt really bad. If it's from ordinary culture, it's not that dangerous." Lt. Col. Jeffrey Adamovicz, who was then deputy chief of bacteriology at USAMRIID, says it's unlikely that the contamination stemmed from aerosolized spores, noting that spores would have been found in air filters throughout the building. They were not. Henchal insists that the contaminating anthrax never posed an airborne threat to anyone. Despite acknowledging that the FBI has genetically typed the Ames strain found outside the containment lab, as well as the Daschle letter anthrax, Henchal declined to say whether the two were the same. "I'm not convinced I know the source of the contamination," he says. No one was disciplined for the contamination. Ivins couldn't be reached for comment. USAMRIID declined to permit interviews with staff mentioned in the report. Henchal says lessons from the incident have been used in a revamped biosecurity program. "We're not going to take any shortcuts on safety," he says. Broader safety concerns That such a slip-up occurred in the research center that pioneered safety procedures now used worldwide to deal with lethal microbes raises broader questions, experts say. "The message here from a scientific and policy standpoint is profound," Zelicoff says. "Facilities that are medical and microbiological may not be suitably equipped for dealing with aerosolized versions of the organisms that they otherwise deal with in great safety. ... These facilities probably ought not be located in a heavily populated area. How do you contain smoke?" About 50 maximum-containment labs nationwide harbor the deadliest of bacteria, viruses and toxins. Forty more biodefense research labs are planned in cities such as Atlanta and Boston. In addition to the furor over the plans in Boston, opponents have also taken aim at a lab to be built at the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, citing concerns about excessive secrecy and biosafety. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, which is building its own facility at Fort Detrick, notes that accidents are rare and that planned labs are unlikely to be as deluged with the flood of samples that arrived at USAMRIID as part of the anthrax investigation. "Most scientists do things in a very careful way," Fauci says. "The chance that they'll be working in the same rushed atmosphere they faced at Fort Detrick is very small." Ultimately, the unsolved 2001 anthrax killings still shadow Fort Detrick. The Ames strain of anthrax used in the letters, and found in the contamination incident, was first used in biodefense studies there. For that reason, the FBI briefly shut down parts of the lab this July to look for more clues, searching for stray spores that might match those used in the attack. In August, FBI investigators carted away more lab equipment for analysis, looking for clues that may reveal a link of some kind between the lab and the attacks that can be presented to a grand jury. Army investigators concluded that years of sloppy practices at the lab resulted from neglect of safety procedures, compounded by the pressure of a high-profile criminal case. One researcher described a common room in the lab area as a "rats' nest." And experts say the "sloppiness" documented in the report may complicate prosecution if the anthrax killer is ever caught, especially if defense lawyers can cast doubt on USAMRIID'S reliability. "Any defense lawyer should read this report carefully and keep it in mind when DNA results are being quoted against his (or) her client," says Martin Hugh-Jones of Louisiana State University, a leading expert on anthrax. "I now understand why the FBI (anthrax) letter team is so fascinated by USAMRIID." Contributing: Robert Barbrow and Susan O'Brian |